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Introduction 
We tend to think of cognition as something that takes place inside the heads of individual human 
agents. However, it is clear that many of our cognitive accomplishments depend just as much on our 
ability  to  exploit  the elements  of our  social and  technological  environments  as  they  do  on  the 
information processing dynamics of the biological brain (Smart et al., 2010). Our social networks 
constitute a particularly potent source of bio-external scaffolding: one that shapes, constrains and 
influences the profile of much of our daily cognitive activity. However, the precise way in which 
networks enable a group of agents to coordinate their thoughts and actions in cognitively-productive 
ways is still something of which we have, as yet, very little understanding. This paper is an attempt 
to review the status of our current understanding of network-enabled collective cognition and to 
explore  ways  in  which  our  current  understanding  might  be  improved.  The  primary  targets  for 
discussion  are  the  dynamics  of  belief  propagation and  collective  problem-solving  in  multi-agent 
systems. These phenomena, we suggest, provide potent examples of collective cognition in terms of 
both cognitive state fluctuations (belief propagation) and cognitive processing (collective problem 
solving). In addition to reviewing the literature in these areas, we also present a number of ideas to 
help guide future research efforts. 
Belief Propagation in Heterogeneous Agent Communities  
Imagine a situation where a physically distributed group of individuals are attempting to acquire 
some common understanding of an event, say a humanitarian disaster. Some individuals may have 
direct access to information about the event (either through personal experience or via remote 
sensing capabilities). Others (perhaps the majority) will have to rely on the information they receive 
from their colleagues and co-workers (i.e. the elements of their social network). In both cases, the 
information received by a particular individual is likely to vary in terms of its accuracy, scope and 
quality, and conflicting information is likely to be an all too common occurrence. How will agents’ 
beliefs about the focal event evolve in this situation? Will all the agents eventually converge on a 
common interpretation or understanding of the event, or will distinct interpretations be the norm? 
What, moreover, of the role played by the social/communication network in shaping the overall 
profile of agents’ beliefs about the event? Do some network structures lead to greater convergence 
in agents’ beliefs, and, if so, can this inform our understanding of how some agent communities 




In order to begin making progress on these issues, Glinton et al (2010) report the results of a number 
of  studies  that  seek  to  examine  the  dynamics  of  belief  propagation  in  networked  multi-agent 
systems. Their studies rely on computer simulations involving a large number of agents – with most 
agents receiving information about some external state of affairs via their connected peers and the 
remainder receiving information from a combination of other agents and the external environment 
(see Figure 1). Information from the environment is provided to the agent network via a sensor, 
which simply returns a value of true or false reflecting the state of some fact (F) about the world. 
The task of the agents is to establish beliefs about F by processing information they receive either 
from the sensors or from other agents. Importantly, the information received from sensors is not 
always  accurate:  noise  is  introduced  into  the  sensor  readings  such  that  the  sensor  sometimes 
returns an incorrect value based on a predetermined probability. 
 
Figure 1: Simplified agent network illustrating the dynamics of belief propagation. Some of the agents 
are directly connected to sensor devices (represented by the camera icon), while others receive 
information solely from network neighbours. The figure shows the system in a critical state. Sensor 
readings are obtained at nine successive points in time (s1-s9), and this is sufficient to cause one agent 
(the darkly shaded node) to adopt a belief state of „true‟. The arrows indicate that the belief state 
value is communicated to neighbouring agents, but these neighbouring agents do not change their 
beliefs. The critical threshold for belief change in this system is 0.80. Thus the value of P needs to 
exceed 0.80 before an agent will change their beliefs. Figure adapted from Glinton et al (2010).   
The agents in the simulation compute their belief in F based on equations 1 and 5 (see below). These 
equations determine the agent’s belief that F is true given a particular sensor reading (equation 1), 
or that F is true given the value of F communicated by other agents (equation 5). 
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? = 𝑃 ??? = ???? 𝑃 ??? = ??𝑙??|? = ????   (6) 
? =  1.0 − 𝑃 ??? = ????  𝑃 ??? = ??𝑙??|? = ??𝑙??   (7) 
? = 𝑃 ??? = ???? 𝑃 ??? = ??𝑙??|? = ????   (8) 
In  these  equations,  P(bai)  gives  the  prior  belief of agent  ai  in  the  fact  F,  and  P(sai|F)  gives the 
probability that the sensor will return a given estimate of the fact (true or false) given the actual 
value of F. P(baj|F) is referred to as the conditional probability (CP). It provides a measure of the 
credibility that an agent ai assigns to the value of F received from a neighbouring agent (aj). 
Processing proceeds by making the sensor readings available to the agent network and updating the 
agents’ belief states accordingly. A threshold is used to determine whether an agent believes (at any 
given point in time) whether F is true, false or unknown. And whenever agents change their belief 
from one state to another (e.g. from unknown to true), the state change is communicated to all the 
agent’s neighbours in the network. 
What Glinton et al (2010) observed in these simulations is that for a particular range of CP, the 
dynamics  of  belief  propagation  within  the  agent  community  exhibits  the  properties  of  a  Self-
Organized Critical (SOC) system. That is, the number of agents who converge on a common belief 
state at any given point in time (switching their beliefs to assume a common state of belief in F) is 
characterized by a power law probability distribution, with many small, localized cascades of belief 
change  punctuated  by  much  more  infrequent  system-wide  changes.  What seems  critical to  the 
emergence  of  this  behaviour  is  the  value  of  CP,  or  the  credibility  that  agents  assign  to  the 
information  they  receive  from  other  agents.  When  CP  is  too  low,  agents  will  almost  never  be 
influenced by the decisions of their neighbours, and thus no propagation of belief states occurs. 
When  CP  is  too  high,  the  extent  of  social  influence  is  so  high  that  any  given  agent  may  be 
‘persuaded’ to change its belief based on the input  it receives  from a single neighbour. In this 
situation, large chains of belief propagation do occur, but such events are so frequent they violate 
the statistical characteristics of a SOC system. 
As Glinton et al (2010) recognize, the dynamics of belief propagation in the system are determined 
by a combination of the decision threshold and the specific value of CP. These factors combine to 
provide  a  local  resistance  to  belief  change.  Pretty  much  as  the  friction  between  sand  grains 
contributes to the SOC dynamics of avalanches in an ever-growing sandpile (Bak et al., 1983), so too 
the resistance to social influence (i.e. the resistance to belief state changes following communication 
with connected peers) seems to determine the emergent profile of cognitive state changes in a 




“The large avalanches occur because...P(baj|F) acts as a local resistance to changing 
belief  when  receiving  a  neighbours  belief...In  certain  circumstances  given  the  data 
received by agents thus far, many agents will simultaneously reach a state where they 
are near the threshold. In this case a single incoming piece of data to any of the agents 
will cause an avalanche of belief changes.” (Glinton et al., 2010) 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 exemplify this phenomenon. In the figures, P0 gives the prior (initial) belief of 
each agent and St corresponds to a sensor reading received at time t. Figure 1 shows a state where 
many agents are near the critical threshold for changing their beliefs as a result of a series of sensor 
readings S1...S9. Figure 2 shows the effect of adding one additional sensor reading, S10. There is a 
cascade of cognitive state changes as each agent changes their belief about F. The arrows in Figure 2 
reflect the sequence of changes as each agent in the network switches its belief to coincide with the 
belief states adopted by all other agents.  
 
Figure 2: The same network as in Figure 1, this time following the addition of a single sensor reading 
(s10). The sensor reading causes a cascade of belief state changes, with all agents changing their 
belief to „true‟. The arrows in this figure indicate the flow of information around the network. Figure 
adapted from Glinton et al (2010).  
We can now begin to see why the cognitive dynamics of a networked multi-agent system might be 
profoundly affected by exposure to limited subsets of information. Providing we approach the kind 
of conditions modelled by Glinton et al (2010), the scale of cognitive state changes need not be in 
proportion to the apparent ‘significance’ of information to which (at least some) members of the 
agent community are exposed. Instead, large-scale (community-wide) changes in cognitive state may 
occur in response to the receipt of seemingly trivial pieces of additional information (for example, a 
single sensor reading in the case of Glinton et al (2010)). Inasmuch as the findings of Glinton et al 









































like resistance to social influence and the degree of inter-agent trust (corresponding to CP in Glinton 
et al (2010)) might impact the ‘effective’ cognitive significance of external information, particularly in 
terms of its ability to precipitate large-scale, discontinuous transitions in the cognitive states of 
multiple (perhaps all) agents.     
One factor that still needs to be considered here concerns the impact of network structure on belief 
dynamics. In one experiment, Glinton et al (2010) organized the agents into networks with different 
topologies (scale free, small world, hierarchical, and so on). They then examined the effect of these 
topologies on the extent of belief state changes. What they observed was that, for each type of 
network, as the value of CP increased, the size of belief cascades also increased. Thus, the effect of 
increasing  levels  of  CP  was  largely  the  same  across  all  network  types,  although  the  effect  was 
particularly  pronounced  for  the  scale-free  and  small  world  networks  and  attenuated  for  the 
hierarchical networks.  
In an important extension of Glinton et al’s (2010) work, Parachuri et al (2010) attempted to assess 
the effect of including a model of human agents in the network simulations. A human agent was 
distinguished from a synthetic agent by assigning them a much larger CP value and reducing the 
frequency of belief updates. Human agents thus updated their beliefs less frequently, and when they 
did update (and change) their belief, their influence was significantly greater than that exerted by a 
conventional synthetic agent. The basis for these differences is the assumption that (in the case of 
elevated CP) “humans are good at analyzing (given particular information) and hence agents believe 
in humans more”, and (in the case of reduced frequency of belief updates) “humans are slower to 
sense the environment or update their beliefs”.  
Following the integration of human agents into the simulation, Parachuri et al (2010) report what 
they refer to as an ‘enabler-impeder effect’. This means that the progressive addition of human 
agents results in an initial facilitation of belief propagation (when the proportion of human agents to 
synthetic agents is relatively low), followed by an inhibition of belief propagation as the proportion 
of human agents increases. In accounting for this effect, Parachuri et al (2010) comment that the 
“enabler effect is due to the fact that agents have a higher belief in humans while the impeder effect 
is due to the fact that humans have a high latency between successive belief calculations”. 
What these results highlight is that differences between agents in a social network can profoundly 
affect the dynamics of cognitive state changes at the collective level. Although factors such as the 
structural organization of the network are commonly seen as crucial in terms of our understanding 
of network behaviour, the findings of Parachuri et al (2010) highlight the potential significance of 
compositional  factors.  Thus,  the  key  manipulation  introduced  by  Parachuri  et  al  (2010)  was  to 
exacerbate the extent of inter-individual differences within the agent community, thereby making 
the  composition  of  the  network  more  heterogeneous.  This  heterogeneity  (manifest  in  the 
differential credibility assigned to agent communications) was shown to  influence the extent to 
which aspects of systemic behaviour (belief cascades) could be observed. The results are thus an 
important  reminder  of  the  potential  significance  of  individual  differences  to  the  emergence  of 
collective phenomena. Although much work in network science tends to overlook differences at the 
nodal level, choosing instead to create homogeneous networks of rather simple nodal elements, it is 
clear that many real-world networks are highly heterogeneous in terms of their composition. Human 




and psychological dimensions (e.g. social status, authority, susceptibility to social influence, and so 
on). What the results of Glinton et al (2010) and Parachuri et al (2010) demonstrate is that we would 
probably do well to at least consider such differences if we are ever to get a grip on the collective 
cognitive dynamics of real-world social networks. 
Modelling the Dynamics of Collective Cognition: A Network-Based Approach 
to Socially-Mediated Cognitive Change  
Towards a Naturalistic Model of Socially-Mediated Cognitive Change 
Developing  an  interesting  model  of  network-enabled  collective  cognition  arguably  requires  two 
essential ingredients: a healthy dose of psychological realism and a rather liberal spicing of real-
world simplification. Any network model clearly needs to make some simplifying assumptions about 
the  real  world;  otherwise  it  loses  the  elements  of  computational  tractability  and  explanatory 
concision that make it useful as an aid to both analysis and comprehension. A network model should 
also (potentially at least) avail itself of a degree of psychological realism. Psychological realism is 
important  whenever  aspects  of  human  psychology  can  be  seen  to  change  the  dynamics  of 
information  flow  and  influence  in  a  social  network.  Thus  we  saw,  in  the  case  of  the  study  by 
Parachuri et al (2010), that individual differences can sometimes exert a significant impact in terms 
of the profile of cognitive state changes at the systemic level, and this highlights one way in which 
many conventional network studies (which countenance the use of largely undifferentiated nodal 
elements) may fall short as models of collective cognitive flux in real-world social contexts. That said, 
it should be clear that the studies of Parachuri et al (2010) (and Glinton et al (2010)) also adopt very 
simplistic models of belief propagation, and these models are, in all likelihood, inadequate when it 
comes  to  understanding  the  dynamics  of  socially-constrained  belief  propagation
1.  Although the 
studies of Glinton et al  (2010)  and Parachuri et  al  (2010)  provide some initial insight into the 
dynamics of belief propagation in heterogeneou s agent communities, the studies use a highly 
simplified model of belief reflecting agents’ beliefs about the veracity of a particular fact (e.g. ‘F is 
true’). This situation is unlike that encountered in more naturalistic
2, real-world settings. In most 
real-world contexts, agents will possess a variety of beliefs, and the truth or falsity of any particular 
belief will, in part, be determined by the  ‘logical’  inter-dependencies  between  the  beliefs.  To 
illustrate this point, consider a situation where a human decision-maker is attempting to formulate a 
comprehensive picture of a situation based on a body of incomplete and uncertain information. 
Suppose that the individual has already received some information that leads her to form certain 
beliefs. Now, whenever new information about the situation is received, the new information will be 
evaluated with respect to those pre-existing beliefs. In cases where a conflict is encountered (i.e. 
new information contradicts a prior belief), the individual will either have to revise her pre-existing 
beliefs or discount the newly received information. The point here is simply that whenever an agent 
                                                           
1 This is, of course, not quite a case of being ‘hoisted with one’s own petard’. Both Glinton et al (2010) and 
Parachuri et al (2010) study networks that are comprised largely of synthetic rather than human agents. As a 
result, issues of psychological fidelity are not their primary concern, and the tenability of their conclusions are 
not undermined by a failure to address such issues.  
2  Just as the paradigm of naturalistic decision making  (Zsambok & Klein, 1997)   emphasizes the disparity 
between conventional cognitive models of decision-making and the reality of much real -world cognition, so 
the current discussion emphasizes the mismatch between conventional network models of collective cognition 




entertains multiple beliefs, their background (e.g. causal) knowledge often enables them to detect 
inconsistencies  between  belief  states,  and  such  inconsistencies  can  influence  decisions  about 
whether new information is accepted or rejected. In cases where conflicting information is accepted, 
the agent will be forced to revise existing beliefs (or at least downgrade the certainty assigned to 
those beliefs). And in cases where such information is rejected, we can begin to understand its lack 
of influence in terms of an existing complex of inter-dependent belief states. 
The inter-dependencies between an individual’s beliefs lead to what may be called states of variable 
cognitive consistency. A state of high cognitive consistency is one in which a set of inter-dependent 
cognitions (beliefs, values or attitudes, or whatever) are highly compatible and mutually reinforcing. 
A state of low cognitive consistency, in contrast, is one in which we encounter a set of largely 
incompatible or conflicting cognitions. Suppose, for example, that an individual’s belief system is 
represented as a collection of 5 separate beliefs, each of which is modelled as a binary variable 
(where 1 represents a situation where an agent believes some fact is true, and 0 represents a 
situation  where  the  agent  believes  some  fact  is  false).  In  many  cases,  we  will  encounter 
dependencies between the various beliefs, as determined by the logical or causal structure of the 
domain to which the beliefs apply. We can represent these dependencies via a set of rules that 
indicate how a change in one specific belief is likely to influence the other beliefs to which it is 
connected. Thus, in Figure 3, we can see that if an individual believes that A is true, then it is likely 
that B is true and C is false. If the individual received reliable information at a later date that C was, 
in fact, true, then accommodating that information into the individual’s belief system would lead to 
a state of low cognitive consistency. We can see that for any system of beliefs, which is modelled in 
this way, we can enumerate all the system states that are consistent (i.e. states in which none of the 
beliefs violates the dependency rules), and we can also calculate the relative consistency of different 
system states based on the extent to which the dependency rules are actually violated. As we will 
see below, this manner of modelling belief systems and representing the linkages between various 
beliefs is likely to be relevant to the development of  computational models dealing with belief 
system dynamics at the societal or cultural level. 
 
Figure 3: A primitive belief system exhibiting logical dependencies between specific belief states. For 
any given belief system, we can enumerate all the configurations (combinations of belief states) that 
satisfy the consistency rules and are thus cognitively consistent. We can also compute the relative 
consistency of different configurations based on dependency violations. Note that one extension to this 
model is to assume that the dependencies are probabilistic rather than all-or-none. For example, we 
could associate a specific probability with the rule „If A = true, then B = true‟ to express the level of 
certainty or confidence in the dependency expressed by the rule. 
B C D E A





If A = true, then B = true.
If A = true, then C = false.
If B = true, then D = true.





All this talk of cognitive consistency should strike a chord with those familiar with Festinger’s (1957) 
theory of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance theory is a highly popular and influential theory 
in  social  psychology,  which  maintains  that  individuals  are  under  internal  pressure  to  avoid 
inconsistent or contradictory cognitions. According to dissonance theory, whenever an individual 
perceives an inconsistency in their cognitions, they encounter negative mental states (e.g. anxiety, 
guilt, shame, etc.), and these motivate the individual to attempt to reduce the inconsistency. When 
people’s cognitions are consistent with one another (i.e. high states of cognitive consistency), then 
they are in a state of harmony or cognitive consonance.  
Now,  there  are  clearly  some  important  parallels  between  the  foregoing  discussion  of  cognitive 
consistency and the social psychological notion of cognitive dissonance. Based on the dependencies 
between a variety of individual belief states, we can calculate the extent to which a particular belief 
system  is  in  a  state  of  high  cognitive  consistency  (consonance)  or  low  cognitive  consistency 
(dissonance). We can additionally assume that agents will come under internal pressure to avoid 
dissonant cognitions – they will attempt to avoid states of cognitive dissonance, either by adjusting 
their specific profile of beliefs (engaging in cognitive change), or by rejecting information that would 
lead to dissonant cognitions (discounting disconfirming evidence)
3. Given the widespread influence 
and application of dissonance theory to a variety of areas  of psychology, any model of socially -
mediated cognitive  change  is likely to benefit (in terms of psychological realism) by  embracing 
notions of cognitive consistency.  This, then, is one way in   which the psychological fide lity and 
plausibility  of  computational  models  of  socially -mediated  cognitive  change   can  be  improved. 
Previous attempts to model the cognitive dynamics of social groups tended to adopt models that 
made  a  number  of  simplifying  as sumptions  about  the  complexity  of  human  cognition.  Such 
assumptions were clearly necessary in order to make initial inroads into what is a highly difficult and 
complex problem  area. However, if we are   to  further our  understanding of  how the collective 
cognitive profile of a group of human agents emerges in response to  the vagaries of information 
flow and influence in a variety of networked situations, then it is important we factor in some of the 
real-world features that contribute to the stability (or instability) of cognitive states at the individual 
level. The  notion of  cognitive  consistency,  with  its  obvious  linkages  to  cognitive  dissonance, 
provides, we suggest, the basis for more ecologically-realistic models of socially-mediated cognitive 
change.     
Cognitive Consistency, Epistasis and Boolean Networks 
How  can  we  develop  more  naturalistic,  psychologically-plausible  models  of  collective  cognition 
without reneging on the computational-tractability required for computer simulation? Based on the 
foregoing discussion, we suggest that the agents in such models need to be considerably more 
complex than those typically employed in previous network science studies (Glinton et al., 2010; 
Watts,  2002).  In  particular,  we  suggest  that  we  need  to  represent  the  inter-dependencies  and 
linkages between a variety of beliefs, and we need to be able to compute a measure of cognitive 
consistency that (at least in some cases) provides the impetus for internally-driven cognitive change. 
In addition to this, we need to be able to represent the influences exerted by other agents in a social 
                                                           
3 Of course, the strategies pursued by humans to reduce cognitive dissonance are many and varied. They may 
include rationalization, discounting of conflicting information, cognitive change (changes in attitudes, beliefs 




network. We have to accommodate the fact that an individual agent may adopt a particular profile 
of beliefs in response to the beliefs adopted by its neighbours. Furthermore, we have to recognise 
the potentially complex interactions between the (internal) forces of cognitive consistency and the 
(external) forces of social influence. An individual may be differentially resistant to social influence 
depending on their current cognitive state (states of high internal cognitive consistency may make 
an individual relatively invulnerable to social influence), and the cognitive dynamics of the system as 
a  whole  (the  cognitive  trajectories  pursued  by  all  the  agents  in  the  network)  may  be  largely 
governed by the inter-play between these two (occasionally opposing) forces. 
One way of making progress on the model development front is to consider the kind of approaches 
used in the modelling of complex adaptive systems, particularly the kind of approaches used to 
model processes of evolutionary and co-evolutionary change. We saw, in the previous section, that 
the inter-dependencies between the various beliefs of an individual agent can be represented as a 
network  of  links  that  exert  positive  (reinforcing)  and  negative  (contradictory)  influences  on  the 
various  beliefs  to  which  they  are  connected  (see  Figure  3).  The  resulting  system,  comprising  a 
network of inter-linked binary variables, is somewhat similar to the notion of Boolean networks as 
described by the complexity theorist Stuart Kauffman (1993, 1995). According to Kauffman (1993) 
Boolean networks are: 
“systems  of  binary  variables,  each  with  two  possible  states  of  activity  (on  and  off) 
coupled to one another such that the activity of each element is governed by the prior 
activity of some elements according to a Boolean switching function.” (pg. 182). 
Boolean  networks,  Kauffman  argues,  enable  us  to  explore  the  role  of  self-organization  in  the 
evolution of complex biological systems. He identifies a number of regimes in which such networks 
can operate, including the ordered, chaotic and complex regimes, with self-organization emerging as 
a feature of the complex regime. In the complex regime, writes Kauffman (1993), we encounter a 
phase transition which is poised between order and chaos. In this transition region “altering the 
activity  of  single  unfrozen  elements  [network  nodes]  unleashes  avalanches  of  change  with  a 
characteristic size distribution having many small and a few large avalanches” (pg. 174)
4.  
The thing that determines whether a Boolean network lies in one or other of these regimes is the 
number of links between the nodes. Thus Kauffman (1993, 1995) shows that as the number of 
linkages or dependencies between the binary elements increases, the network becomes increasingly 
disordered or chaotic. Kauffman (1993, 1995), in fact, describes the linkages between the binary 
elements in terms of the genetic phenomenon of epistasis, which is the dependency between genes 
in respect of their fitness contributions to the organism of which they are a part. It should be clear 
that the fitness contributions of genes encoding for specific traits or features depends, to a large 
extent, on whatever other genes are simultaneously present in the genotype. Thus a gene that 
encodes for dense and heavy bones may be of benefit to a large, flightless bird, but it is unlikely to 
be useful in the case of a small, flying one. The main point here is that the fitness contributions of 
genes are rarely independent of other genes; rather, genes interact in complex ways to co-constrain 
their respective fitness contributions to the organism of which they are a part. 
                                                           
4 This profile of frequently occurring small avalanches and infrequently occurring large avalanches should bring 




Epistatic linkages thus determine the extent to which genes are free to vary: if no epistatic linkages 
exist, then each gene is free to vary independently of every other gene; if such linkages do exist, 
then  the  fitness  contribution  of  one  gene  is,  in  part,  determined  by  the  genes  to  which  it  is 
epistatically  connected.  In  the  context  of  Boolean  networks,  the  complex  regime  emerges  at 
intermediate levels of epistasis. Thus, if the number of epistatic connections is low, the system is 
highly ordered, whereas if the number of epistatic connections is high, the system is highly chaotic. 
Between  these  two  regimes,  at  intermediate  levels  of  epistatic  connectivity,  we  encounter  the 
complex  regime.  It  is  here,  Kauffman  (1993,  1995)  argues,  that  we  see  the  potential  for  self-
organization and evolutionary change. 
In formalizing the notion of epistasis, Kauffman (1993, 1995) develops a model that has come to be 
known as the NK model. It is essentially a model for generating evolutionary fitness landscapes with 
different degrees of ruggedness. Within the model, there are two parameters: N (which refers to the 
number of genes) and K (which refers to the number of epistatic linkages between the genes). In 
terms of our discussion about Boolean networks (and belief systems), N refers to the number of 
binary elements in the network (the number of beliefs in the belief system) and K refers to the 
number of linkages between the binary elements (the number of inter-dependencies between the 
different  beliefs).  Kauffman  (1993,  1995)  shows  that  by  using  these  two  parameters,  we  can 
generate  a  variety  of  ‘tunable  fitness  landscapes’,  each  of  which  differs  with  respect  to  the 
ruggedness of their topography. Thus, when K = 0, there are no epistatic connections between the 
elements (genes, beliefs, or whatever), and thus each is free to change independently of the others 
(the fitness contribution of each gene is independent of all others in the genotype). In this situation, 
Kauffman shows that the fitness landscape is very smooth, and the landscape contains a single 
global optima. For K > 0, the fitness landscape becomes increasingly rugged, so that when K = N – 1 
(the maximum value of K), the landscape is maximally rugged. 
The  effect  of  K,  therefore,  is  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  adjacent  points  on  the  fitness 
landscape are correlated – what Kauffman refers to as the correlation structure of the landscape. 
This is important, because it impacts on the extent to which evolutionary processes, occurring via a 
gradual  process  of  genetic  change,  are  possible.  To  better  understand  this,  consider  a  system 
composed of 3 binary elements. There are (2
3) 8 possible individual variations within this system 
(e.g. <000>, <001>, <011>, and so on), and an adjacent individual within this system is an individual 
that differs with respect to a single binary value (e.g. <000> is adjacent to <001>). If we assume that 
each  individual  occupies  a  particular  point  on  the  fitness  landscape,  then  the  effect  of  K  is  to 
determine the correlation between the fitness values assigned to adjacent individuals. K, in other 
words,  determines  the  structural  profile  of  the  fitness  landscape  against  which  evolutionary 
processes take place. High values of K produce landscapes that are like jagged moonscapes, with 
soaring peaks and plummeting cliffs; low values of K produce landscapes that are like the archetypal 
English countryside, with gentle slopes and rolling hills. 
So what does this discussion of NK models and fitness landscapes have to do with our notions of 
cognitive consistency and socially-mediated cognitive change? Well, we have seen that one model of 
a  belief  system  represents  beliefs  as  binary  variables,  with  each  binary  variable  reflecting  an 
individual agent’s belief in a particular fact. We have also seen that the notion of epistasis could be 
applied to the problem of representing the inter-dependencies between individual beliefs. In this 




particular belief to the overall level of cognitive consistency would depend on whatever other beliefs 
were possessed by the individual. By applying Kauffman’s NK model to this notion of ‘epistatic binary 
belief  system’,  we  can  begin  to  see  that  each  type  of  belief  system  can  be  associated  with  a 
particular kind of ‘fitness landscape’, one whose topography depends on the number of beliefs in 
the  system  (N)  and  the  linkages  between  those  beliefs  (K).  This  fitness  landscape  will  provide 
information about the relative fitness of different belief configurations, and the fitness of each belief 
configuration will be determined by the internal consistency of the belief states. What we have, 
therefore,  is  a  way  of  representing  the  inter-dependencies  between  beliefs,  and  a  way  of 
representing the fitness of different belief configurations in terms of their cognitive consistency. The 
high  points  on  this  fitness  landscape  indicate  states  of  high  cognitive  consistency  (to  which  an 
individual will typically be attracted); the low points indicate states of low cognitive consistency 
(from which an individual will typically be repelled). The pursuit of more consistent cognitive states 
(or fitter solutions), in this case, emulates the individual’s efforts to arrive at internally consistent 
cognitive states – the individual is constantly driven to adopt fitter (and therefore more consistent) 
variants of their current cognitive state (providing that such fitter states are available, or at least 
reachable). For each particular configuration of beliefs, we can derive a measure of fitness based on 
the consistency between the beliefs, and we can then use this to evaluate the relative desirability of 
different belief configurations. In the context of this model, we can assume that individuals will be 
motivated to seek out local optima within the fitness landscape – they will move from lower to 
higher points on the fitness landscape by adopting beliefs that are progressively more consistent. Of 
course, the process of belief change within this model is analogous to the process of mutation in 
evolutionary models: an individual changes her beliefs by random mutation of the current belief 
configuration  (switching  the  value  of  one  or  more  binary  variables),  and  thereby  moving  to  a 
different point on the fitness landscape. 
At this point, it may help to have a concrete example of the application of the NK model in order to 
exemplify what has been discussed thus far. The example presented here is based (loosely) on the 
work of Ahouse et al (1992) and the associated commentary provided by Monge and Contractor 
(2003). In particular, it takes the example described by Monge and Contractor (2003) and applies it 
to the case of coalition plan evaluation described by Rasmussen et al (2009). As we will see in 
subsequent sections, the work of Ahouse et al (1992) is important because it attempts to apply 
Kauffman’s NK model to the co-evolutionary dynamics of multiple belief systems. Furthermore, the 
introduction of belief systems that specifically target the domain of coalition planning establishes a 
nice linkage with recent work on the modelling of causally-connected belief networks (Rasmussen et 
al., 2009)
5. As we will see, such work may provide a means for us to apply the NK model to issues of 
cultural change and ideological stability. 
Let us assume that an individual,  i, has a belief system consisting of three beliefs, B1i, B2i and B3i. 
These three beliefs reflect the individual’s attitudes to aspects of the military coalition planning 
process and the relationship of these aspects to positive planning outcomes (e.g. the generation of a 
high quality coalition plan). These beliefs could be, for example:  
1)  that plans should be developed in as much detail as possible,  
2)  that plans should be developed as rapidly as possible, and  
                                                           




3)  that plans should based on as much feedback as possible.  
These three beliefs can each take a value of 0 or 1, with 1 reflecting strong endorsement of the 
belief and 0 reflecting little or no endorsement of the belief. Thus, an individual whose belief system 
has the form <100> would strongly believe in the importance of developing detailed plans but would 
not be overly concerned about the speed of plan development or the amount of feedback on which 
the plan was based.  
The cognitive consistency of a particular cognitive state (i.e. configuration of beliefs) is determined 
by the inter-dependencies between the individual beliefs. These inter-dependencies may, let us 
assume, be of either a positive or negative nature, so that beliefs may either reinforce other beliefs 
(contributing to high cognitive consistency) or contradict other beliefs (contributing to low cognitive 
consistency). For instance, an individual’s belief that plans should be developed in as much detail as 
possible (B1) may be difficult to reconcile with the fact that plans should be developed as quickly as 
possible (B2); however, it may sit very comfortably alongside the belief that plans should be based 
on high levels of feedback (B3). Within the NK model, these relationships correspond to epistatic ties 
between the beliefs and, as discussed previously, they influence the topographic structure of the 
fitness landscape against which we judge the fitness of specific belief configurations. For the sake of 
argument, let us assume that the number of epistatic ties on each belief is 2. This gives us our value 
of K in the NK model (N, of course, is equal to 3 because the belief system comprises 3 beliefs). The 
dependencies between the specific beliefs are as follows: 
1.  B1 contradicts B2 and reinforces B3 (if B1 = 0, then B2 = 0 and B3 = 1) 
2.  B2 contradicts B1 and B3 (if B2 = 1, then B1 = 0 and B3 = 0) 
3.  B3 contradicts B2 and reinforces B1 (if B3 = 1, then B2 = 0 and B1 = 1) 
We can now define Kpqi as the epistatic constraint for agent i between belief pi and qi, where:  
Kpqi = 1 if p reinforces q, and pi = qi, else 0  
Kpqi = 1 if p contradicts q, and pi ≠ qi, else 0  
Kpqi = 0 if p neither reinforces or contradicts q  
Kpqi = 1 if p and q are the same belief  
Thus, if p were B1 and q were B2, and we were to assume that B1 contradicts B2, then we would get:  
Kpqi = 1 if B1i contradicts B2i, and B1i ≠ B2i, else 0  
If an individual had the belief <010>, K12i would be 1 since B1i and B2i are not equal to each other 
(B1i = 0 and B2i = 1).  
Now, clearly the kind of beliefs possessed by a specific individual will determine their overall level of 
cognitive  consistency.  An  individual  with  the  belief  configuration  <110>  will  have  greater 
inconsistency (and thus more cognitive dissonance) than an individual with the belief configuration 
<100>, simply because the latter belief system reduces the conflict between B1 and B2. For any 
individual, we can define W(B1i) as the level of cognitive consistency based on an individual’s belief 




cognitive consistency will be based on the other two beliefs, namely B2 and B3. In general, the 
contribution of each belief (b) to an individual’s overall level of cognitive consistency can be denoted 
as W(bi), where:  
W b?  =  Σ(w?K???)  (9) 
Thus, the contribution of each belief to the overall measure of cognitive consistency is the sum of 
the epistatic constraints between p and all q beliefs, weighted by a parameter (wq), which measures 
the significance of that constraint.  
The overall level of cognitive consistency for an individual with a specific configuration of beliefs can 
now be defined as:  
W? = 1 N     Σ Wb?    (10) 
which can be interpreted as the fitness (cognitive consistency) of a particular belief configuration.  
Now that we have computed a measure of fitness in terms of cognitive consistency, we can begin to 
model the ‘evolution’ of cognitive states based on the changes in cognitive consistency that result 
from changes in one or more beliefs. If  we consider an individual with the belief  configuration 
<001>, then we can see that, with respect to the dependencies between various beliefs, the belief 
configuration  <101>  represents  the  most  optimal  nearest  neighbour  in  terms  of  cognitive 
consistency. As such, we would expect an individual to endorse B1 as well as B3 because these 
beliefs reinforce one another. We would not expect an individual to endorse B2 and B3 because 
these beliefs contradict one another and thus constitute dissonant cognitions.  
Once an individual has reached a local optima in terms of the consistency of their beliefs, we might 
expect such a cognitive state to be highly stable. We can see that once the form of an individual’s 
belief  system  is  <101>,  it  is  impossible  to  move  to  a  neighbouring  belief  configuration  without 
reducing overall cognitive consistency. As such, the configuration <101> is a highly stable cognitive 
state. All else being equal, we should not expect this belief configuration to change. If this profile of 
belief states were to characterize the mental life of a human agent, then we might expect them to 
be very resistant to cognitive change; they would, in all likelihood, emerge as very ‘stuck in their 
ways’, and it would be almost impossible to persuade them to think about things in a different way 
(i.e.  to  adopt  a  different  cognitive  outlook).  In  fact,  the  only  way  such  an  individual  could  be 
persuaded to change their views would be if we could vary more than one belief at a time. In this 
case, we might encourage them to shift to an alternative mindset of equal consistency, namely 
<010>. This configuration of beliefs is equally consistent to <101>, but it requires a rather radical 
shift in belief states. In fact, all three beliefs need to change in order to move from one cognitive 
state to the other. While such transitions may seem insignificant when we are dealing with a belief 
system consisting of  only three beliefs,  the scale of the cognitive state changes becomes more 
profound as the number of beliefs (and dependencies between the beliefs) increases. It may, in fact, 
be totally unrealistic to assume that large numbers of beliefs could all change at the same time in 




One value of the kind of model presented here is that it may help us understand more about the 
psycho-dynamics  of  cognitive  change.  Obviously,  there  is  a  rich  psychological  literature  here  to 
which we cannot begin to do justice to in the context of this paper. A couple of points are, however, 
worth noting about the potential for cognitive change in epistatic binary belief systems. One point is 
that  a  high  number  of  epistatic  links  between  beliefs  may  make  it  difficult  to  modify  belief 
configurations  that  already  occupy  local  optima.  Such  cognitive  states  can,  in  general,  only  be 
changed by making rather large-scale jumps to alternative points in the fitness landscape. If we want 
to encourage cognitive change in such systems, a couple of options seem worth considering (see 
Monge & Contractor, 2003). Firstly, we can attempt to reduce the number of epistatic connections 
between beliefs. This might be accomplished by changing an individual’s perceptions of the linkages 
between beliefs or (in the case of causal knowledge) modifying their knowledge about the causal 
contingencies between particular states of affairs. In the case of our planning example, we might 
attempt  to  introduce  new  types  of  planning  technologies  that  support  the  rapid  assembly, 
evaluation and revision of military plans. This would act to reduce the perceived incompatibility 
between the three beliefs. A second strategy we might adopt to encourage cognitive change relates 
to the number of beliefs contributing to overall states of cognitive consistency. Thus, if we were to 
introduce additional beliefs that made independent contributions to cognitive consistency, then this 
would provide more freedom for beliefs B1, B2, and B3 to change without necessarily reducing the 
overall level of cognitive consistency for an individual agent (much, of course, depends here on the 
nature of the epistatic linkages between the new beliefs).   
Coupled Belief Systems  
Thus far in this section we have considered cognitive change as something that is driven by an 
individual’s internal motivation to establish consistent cognitions. It should be clear, however, that 
individual cognition is also influenced by social factors. The network models of both Watts (2002) 
and  Glinton  et  al  (2010)  attempt  to  capture  this  social  context,  and  this  is  what  makes  them 
interesting as network-based models of collective cognitive flux. Now that we have discussed the 
intra-individual forces that govern cognitive change, it is time to consider the role of social forces in 
influencing  such  change.  It  is  time,  in  other words,  to  consider  the  interplay  between  network 
dynamics at both the intra-individual (belief network) and inter-individual (social network) levels. 
One attempt to model the influence of social factors on individual cognition is provided by Ahouse et 
al (1992). This study is highly relevant to the present discussion because it attempts to extend the NK 
model  outlined  above  in  order  to  accommodate  the  effects  of  social  influence  on  individual 
cognition. Ahouse et al’s (1992) approach is based on an extension to Kauffman’s NK model, called 
the NK(C) model. This model was developed by Kauffman to provide insight into co-evolutionary 
processes. It extends the NK model with an additional parameter, C, which represents the inter-
dependencies between the traits of different species in terms of their fitness contributions to a given 
individual.  Thus,  whereas  K  represents  the  linkages  or  dependencies  between  the  genes  of  a 
particular  individual,  C  represents  the  linkages  or dependencies  between  the  genes of  different 
individuals. We can make sense of this notion by thinking about the fact that the relative fitness of 
particular traits (as manifested by a particular individual) depends, to a large extent, on the kind of 
traits  possessed  by  other  individuals  who  occupy  the  same  ecological  niche.  Thus  the  fitness 
implications of a gene that encodes for large, dense bones may be relatively minor if the bird in 




flight and not worry about the consequences. Things are clearly not so rosy, however, if some of the 
other species in the bird’s environment acquire teeth, claws and a taste for flightless bird! Now, the 
fitness implications of a gene for large, dense bones are a cause for great concern. Whereas before, 
large, heavy bones were of little consequence to the bird (and may even have been of adaptive 
value), now they negatively affect the ability of birds to survive and reproduce. All this, of course, 
simply serves to remind us that no one gene is necessarily good or bad from a fitness perspective. 
What matters is the kind of genes that get expressed elsewhere, both within the same individual and 
in other individuals which (for better or worse) must be interacted with. As with many things in life, 
the success or failure of one’s own strategies largely depends on whatever strategies are adopted by 
others in one’s social environment.   
The addition of the C parameter is thus an important addition to the NK model. It represents the fact 
that the fitness of any individual is often highly dependent on the features possessed by other 
individuals. As one individual evolves a particular set of features, it changes the fitness of features 
possessed  by  other  (inter-linked)  individuals.  As  one  species  adapts  to  the  exigencies  of  its 
environment, so it changes the kind of exigencies that other species must deal with. And, as we have 
seen,  a  trait  whose  contribution  to  evolutionary  fitness  is  irrelevant  at  one  point  in  time  may 
suddenly become highly significant as the traits of other species change. The image that emerges is 
thus  one  of  a  highly  dynamic  inter-dependence  between  the  evolutionary  fitness  landscapes of 
different species. The evolutionary landscapes of species are coupled to one another, such that as 
one species moves about on its fitness landscape, seeking out locally optimal design solutions, the 
topographic structure of other landscapes to which that species is connected are systematically 
deformed. And once the individuals on the newly deformed landscape begin to adapt and explore 
their new terrain (again searching for local optima), their actions will feed-back to the landscape of 
the original species, perhaps undermining the integrity of recently scaled peaks. 
We can now begin to see how the cognitive influences between agents in a social network might be 
modelled.  Whereas  the  original  application  of  the  NK  model  (to  the  notion  of  intra-individual 
cognitive consistency and cognitive change) adopted the notion of a fixed fitness landscape against 
which individuals were motivated to seek out progressively fitter solutions, the image that emerges 
from a consideration of the NK(C) model is one of a highly dynamic fitness landscape that is in a 
constant  state of  flux.  The  source of  such  dynamism,  in  a  social  network  context,  is  the  inter-
dependence between the cognitive states of different social actors. Thus, whether a particular belief 
configuration is associated with a high fitness score, and thus occupies a lofty peak on a fitness 
landscape, is not just a function of the consistency of one’s own internal cognitions; it also depends 
on whatever other beliefs are adopted by individuals with whom one interacts. If the individuals 
within one’s social network
6 adopt beliefs that are different from  one’s own, then one may be 
influenced to modify their beliefs, particularly if the fitness of one’s own beliefs is less than that 
possessed by one’s peers. 
The  notion  of  coupled  belief  systems  is  thus  important  because  it  provides  a  means  for  us  to 
represent the influence relationships between individuals in a social network. In place of a single, 
individual belief system, striving for internal cognitive consistency against a fixed fitness landscape, 
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we now have multiple, dynamic closely-coupled belief systems. As one individual strives for cognitive 
consistency,  so  they  influence  the  relative  fitness  against  which  other’s  cognitive  states  are 
evaluated. And whereas before we encountered individuals who were often stuck in highly stable 
cognitive  states  (i.e.  local  optima)  and  therefore  resistant  to  social  influence,  we  now  have  a 
situation in which the dynamics of intra-individual cognitive change are highly sensitive to the profile 
of  cognitive state  fluctuations  elsewhere  in  the  social  network.  As one  individual  changes  their 
beliefs, so they influence the stability of cognitive states  in those individuals to whom they are 
connected via social ties. In essence, the  collective beliefs of all individuals  in a social network 
provides the cognitive niche in which the cognitive state of any given individual evolves. As Monge 
and Contractor (2003) comment:  
“...adding  the  C  component  into  the  NK  models  makes  the  situation  much  more 
complicated  since  an  individual‟s  cognitive  consistency  can  now  be  reinforced  or 
contradicted by the beliefs of other individuals in the system. In order to achieve the 
highest level of cognitive consistency fitness value an individual must now not only have 
beliefs that reinforce one another, but also have ties with other individuals whose beliefs 
reinforce the individual‟s beliefs. If, at any time, any of these other individuals change 
their beliefs the focal individual‟s cognitive consistency will be altered. Hence, unlike the 
NK models, the fitness landscape for each individual is no longer constant...Instead, each 
individual‟s fitness landscape is constantly changing depending on the beliefs of other 
individuals with which this individuals has ties and their potentially changing beliefs.” 
(pg. 283)          
What the NK(C) model gives us, then, is a model of coupled belief systems in which the fitness 
landscape associated with each individual’s belief system is dynamically influenced by the beliefs 
adopted by other (connected) individuals. The precise nature of the coupling relationships are, it 
should be clear, determined by the structure of the social network in which an agent is embedded. 
Thus any given agent will be influenced by those agents to which they are connected, and the C 
parameter in the NK(C) model will be determined by these connections. The result is a complex 
model of belief system dynamics in which the role of social network structure may be expected to 
interact, in as yet largely unknown ways, with the internal cognitive dynamics of specific individuals.   
Stability and Change in Coupled Belief Systems   
The foregoing discussion may have created the impression that cognitive states, under the influence 
of social forces, are forever apt to change – that cognitive stability is something that emerges only 
on rare occasions. This is not necessarily the case. There are situations in which globally stable 
cognitive states can emerge in coupled belief systems. In particular, NK(C) models may occasionally 
result in Nash equilibria, in which the local optima of one individual is consistent with all the local 
optima of the individuals to which that individual is connected. In the case of coupled belief systems, 
a Nash equilibrium means that each individual within a network (or sub-part thereof) has reached a 
local  optima  that  cannot  be  improved  upon,  providing  other  individuals  persist  with  their  own 
specific belief configurations. Since this applies to all individuals, no individual has anything to gain 




stability in which no further (internally-driven
7) change is possible. As Monge and Contractor (2003) 
comment, a Nash equilibrium means:  
“that each individual has acquired the most cognitively consistent belief configuration 
that can be achieved while taking into account the belief configurations of all other 
individuals in the system.” (pg. 284) 
Although  Nash  equilibria  may  be  rarely  encountered  in  the  type  of  network  contexts  we  are 
considering here, comprised as they are of large numbers of interacting individuals
8, if they do occur, 
then a stable profile of belief configurations emerges in which no individual benefits by unilaterally 
changing his or her beliefs. Unless the system is disturbed by some exogenous force, the system will 
become cognitively inert, ceasing to engage in any further form of cognitive change.  
As Monge and Contractor (2003) are quick to point out, Nash equilibria are not necessarily good for 
a system. What such equilibria mean, in the case we are considering here, is that each individual has 
attained the highest level of cognitive consistency that can be achieved given the profile of cognitive 
states adopted by all other individuals. The presence of Nash equilibria  does not necessarily mean 
that the population, as a whole,  has settled on the most collectively -optimal solution. Just as the 
Nash equilibria for some forms of the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game may mean that each individual has 
to settle for strategies that result  in sub-optimal payoffs for all the participants, the emergence of 
Nash equilibria in the case of coupled belief systems may mean that each individual has to make do 
with rather unsatisfactory levels of internal cognitive consistency. While this may very well reflect 
the mundane reality of everyday social living, with social interaction requiring all manner of personal 
compromises and concessions, it is nevertheless important that we understand how the dynamics of 
information flow and influence in networked communities of cognitive agents contributes to the 
emergence  of  these  states.  Moreover,  it  is  possible  that  as  we  understand  more  about  the 
relationship  between  network  structure  and  cognitive  dynamics,  we  will  encounter  new 
opportunities  for  influencing  the  long-term  cognitive  outcomes  of  such  systems,  biasing  their 
behaviour in ways that benefit both the individual and the social collectives of which they are a part.    
Cultural Models and Collective Cognition  
Thus far, we have adopted a model in which the focus has been on individual agents and their social 
relationships. The belief systems in this model were deemed to be those of specific individuals, 
embedded  in  social  networks.  Belief  systems  need  not,  however,  be  modelled  at  the  level  of 
individual agents. An alternative approach is to develop an aggregate model of beliefs (and their 
associated linkages), which reflects the coarse-grained regularities associated with the belief systems 
of multiple individuals from a specific population. The technique of Cultural Network Analysis (CNA) 
is  designed  to  produce  such  models  (Sieck  &  Rasmussen,  2007;  Sieck  et  al.,  2010).  CNA  is  a 
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external to the social system under consideration. 
8 Kauffman (1993, 1995) argues that Nash equilibria rapidly emerge in NK(C) systems where K > S * C. Since S in 
this equation (at least in our case) represents the number of individuals that are interacting in the model, we 
can see that Nash equilibria are unlikely to emerge in any system except those in which the number of 
epistatic links between individual beliefs is exceptionally high. Of course, much depends here on how we 
interpret the parameter S. In a later section, we will encounter an alternative interpretation of S that equates 
it with the aggregate belief system of a specific cultural group. In this situation, the S parameter may be quite 




methodology  that  synthesizes  techniques  from  a  range  of  disciplines,  including  cognitive 
anthropology, cultural psychology, naturalistic decision-making, and decision analysis. Its aim is to 
develop models  (referred  to  as  cultural models)  that  capture  the  key  (cognitive)  commonalities 
among a group of individuals in terms of their shared concepts, beliefs and values. Cultural models 
reveal the relative differences and similarities between social groups, and they can be used as the 
basis  for  discriminating  between  specific  cultural  and  sub-cultural  groupings.  An  example  of  a 
cultural model, in this case applied to the domain of military planning, is shown in Figure 4. The 
nodes in this diagram represent concepts and properties associated with the domain of military 
planning,  and  the  linkages  between  the  concepts  reflect  the  community’s  beliefs  regarding  the 
relationships and dependencies between the concepts. The links associated with a plus sign reflect a 
positive  association  between  the  concepts  (e.g.  ‘Level of  detail  in  specification  of  action’  has  a 
positive  effect  on  ‘ease  of  execution’),  whereas  the  links  associated  with  a  minus  sign  reflect 
negative associations between the concepts (e.g. ‘ability to anticipate problems’ has a negative 
effect on the ‘riskiness of a plan’). 
 
Figure 4: Cultural model showing the dependencies between concepts in the domain of military 
coalition planning. 
What  should  be  clear  from  Figure  4  is  that  there  is  a  correspondence  (of  sorts)  between  the 
structure of a cultural model and the kind of epistatically-linked belief systems that we have been 
discussing  thus  far
9.  An important  difference  between the two  models  is that cultural models 
abstract away from the specific details of individual (agent-level) belief systems, focusing instead on 
the common features of such systems . Cultural models are cr eated based on the inter -individual 
similarities between the belief systems of specific individuals, and thus, for any given population, we 
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binary variables where a value of 1 means that the associated feature has the value ‘high’ and a value of 0 
means that the associated feature has the value ‘low’. The positive and negative links between the nodes then 




may end up with a relatively small number of models, each of which reflects a culturally-significant 
grouping of individuals within the larger population. The primary significance of this shift away from 
individual belief systems to more collective, aggregate belief systems is that it enables us to think 
about  the  potential  for  cognitive  change  mediated  by  a  variety  of  cultural-level  influences.  
Something  similar  to  this  is  proposed  by  Ahouse  et  al  (1992).  They  recognize  that  rather  than 
considering the belief systems of specific human individuals, we could consider the belief systems 
associated with entire nation states. Thus, if we consider the general beliefs held by, say, people 
from the US, Russia and Western Europe, we can develop an NK(C) model in which N represents the 
beliefs held by the various populations, K represents the dependencies between the beliefs held by 
each population, and C represents the dependencies between the beliefs held by different nation 
states (e.g. between US and Russia). As suggested by Ahouse et al (1992), these beliefs could be 
about the relative merits of military spending for security, for the overall economy and for the 
extent of government involvement in domestic social policies. Inasmuch as these respective belief 
systems form a coupled belief system, then we may expect the cognitive dynamics of one population 
to influence the fitness landscapes associated with the populations to which it is connected. Thus, a 
shift  in  public  opinion  in  one  population  may  result  in,  perhaps  unexpected,  changes  in  other 
populations. Not only does this extension of the coupled belief system model highlight the potential 
inter-dependencies between nation states (or cultural groups) in terms of their collective cognitive 
outlook,  it  also  indicates  that  international  influences  need  not  necessarily  involve  the  direct 
manipulation  or  targeting  of  foreign  populations.  Instead,  based  on  the  coupled  belief  system 
model, cognitive change may be effected in foreign populations by focusing on the attitudes and 
opinions  of  domestic  populations.  By  introducing  the  right  profile  of  cognitive  change  in  local 
populations
10, the fitness landscapes  against which the ideologies, beliefs, attitudes and values of 
other nation states and cultures take shape are systematically altered. Providing we know the 
pattern of dependencies between the bel ief systems of specific nations and cultural groups, and 
providing the cognitive changes required by the local population are not  overly adverse
11, it seems 
entirely plausible that cognitive changes could be inculcated in one population in order to indirectly 
affect the cognitive dynamics of other, connected populations. 
The transition from individual to collective belief systems raises another important issue, this time 
concerning the issue of cross-cultural cognitive stability and the emergence of Nash equilibria. Recall 
that one concern raised in respect of conventional social networks (in which the actors are individual 
human agents) was that the number of individuals in the models made the emergence of Nash 
equilibria highly unlikely. Nash equilibria are, in fact, only likely to emerge in systems where the 
number of epistatic ties (K) outnumbers the number of individual  agents multiplied by the number 
of dependencies between the  agents’ beliefs (C). Thus in cases where we are dealing with large 
numbers of interacting belief systems (as in most social network contexts), we are unlikely to see the 
emergence of Nash equilibria. In the case of cultural models, however, the number of belief systems 
is relatively small: it corresponds to the number of individual cultural models that feature in any 
given simulation. Providing the internal complexity of the cultural models is sufficiently rich (with 
                                                           
10  Actually,  what  is  important  here  is  not  so  much  the  actual  profile  of  beliefs  adopted  by  a  domestic 
population, so much as the perceptions of the target population. Thus, what is important is not actual change, 
so much as perceived change. The perceptions of a target population could be influenced by the way in which 
various national media portray the beliefs, values and attitudes of domestic populations.  




large numbers of dependencies between the cultural model elements), and providing the number of 
dependencies  between  the  beliefs  of  separate  cultural  models  is  relatively  small,  then  we  may 
expect Nash equilibria to be a relatively common occurrence in the context of cultural-level cognitive 
dynamics. This presents an interesting, although potentially perplexing, possibility: cognitive stability 
will tend to dominate in network simulations pitched at the cultural level (by virtue of inter-cultural 
forms  of  influence),  but  this  will  contrast  with  a  tendency  for  cognitive  instability  in  network 
simulations pitched at the level of social networks (by virtue of the number of belief systems present 
in  any  given  social  network).  Thus,  once  we  take  a  cultural-level  perspective  of  belief  system 
dynamics, the potential for highly stable, albeit collectively sub-optimal, system states becomes a 
realistic possibility. However, when we consider the cognitive dynamics of socially-embedded belief 
systems, we see little possibility for cognitive stability and cognitive flux seems to rule the day.  
Of  course,  whether  you  find  this  state  of  affairs  perplexing  or  not  probably  depends  on  your 
intuitions  regarding  the  relationship  between  cognitive  models  pitched  at  the  individual  and 
collective levels. If you see the structure of collective-level models (e.g. cultural models) as driven 
primarily by the interactions between individuals, and do not see individuals as being influenced by 
the structure of collective models, then you will tend to favour a dynamic view of cultural models in 
which inter-cultural forces make little contribution to the cognitive dynamics of the global belief 
system (the entire collection of belief systems at the individual and collective levels). If, on the other 
hand, you see a potential role for collective-level models in influencing cognitive change at the 
individual level (perhaps because of the influence exerted by cultural artefacts, rituals and symbols), 
then you will tend to see collective-level models as moving towards a Nash equilibrium and the 
potential for individual cognitive change as strongly influenced by forces operating at the cultural, 
national and societal levels.  
A final point about cultural models is worth mentioning here. It is that the content of such models 
often reflects the causal knowledge that a group of individuals has about some domain. Thus the 
linkages between the elements of a cultural model often reflect knowledge about cause and effect 
relationships,  such  as  the  knowledge  that  high  levels  of  shared  understanding  contribute  to 
improved inter-agent synchronization in the case of US military planners (Rasmussen et al., 2009; 
Sieck et al., 2010) (see Figure 4). This serves to remind us that the content of a particular belief 
system is quite open; it could consist of attitudes towards particular things, or it could consist of the 
cause  and effect  relationships  governing  the transitions  between  a  set  of  system  states.  In  the 
former case, our measure of cognitive consistency closely approximates conventional notions of 
cognitive dissonance, with the perceived incompatibility between different attitudes (e.g. a belief in 
animal rights and a belief that is ok to wear fur products) contributing to cognitive inconsistency and 
belief change (at least in some cases). In the latter case, our measure of cognitive consistency could 
be grounded in the overall causal coherence of the belief states, with violations of domain-relevant 
causal knowledge contributing to our measure of cognitive inconsistency and providing the impetus 
for cognitive change. To help us get a better grip on this, consider what we said at the very beginning 
of this sub-section in relation to the processing of situation-relevant information:   
“...consider  a  situation  where  a  human  decision-maker  is  attempting  to  formulate  a 
comprehensive  picture  of  a  situation  based  on  a  body  of  incomplete  and  uncertain 
information. Suppose that the individual has already received information that leads her 




the information  will  be  evaluated  with  respect to those  pre-existing beliefs.  In  cases 
where a conflict is encountered (i.e. new information contradicts a prior belief), the 
individual  will  either  have  to  revise  her  pre-existing  beliefs  or  discount  the  newly 
received information. The point here is simply that whenever an agent entertains multiple 
beliefs,  their  background  (e.g.  causal)  knowledge  often  enables  them  to  detect 
inconsistencies between belief states, and such inconsistencies can influence decisions 
about  whether  new  information  is  accepted  or  rejected.  In  cases  where  conflicting 
information is accepted, the agent will be forced to revise existing beliefs (or at least 
downgrade the certainty assigned to those beliefs); and in cases where such information 
is rejected, we can begin the understand its lack of influence in terms of an existing 
complex of inter-dependent belief states.” 
So we have come full circle. From a consideration of existing models of belief propagation, we have 
encountered a model that sees the dynamic profile of collective cognition as emerging in response 
to a variety of psycho-dynamic and socio-cultural influences. Firstly, we saw that individuals might 
come under internal pressure to change their profile of beliefs based on the perception of specific 
inconsistencies and conflicts. In this case, cognitive change is motivated by a need for consistency 
between beliefs, and the individual strives to minimize inconsistent cognitions. Secondly, we saw 
that cognitive change could come about as a result of forces that operate at the social level of 
analysis. In this case, the individual is influenced by the beliefs possessed by other individuals, and 
cognitive change is likely to strike a balance between social influence and cognitive dissonance. 
Finally, we saw that there might exist collective forces that  influence the cognitive dynamics of 
individuals within specific cultural groupings. This level of analysis emphasizes the potential role that 
inter-cultural relationships play in stabilizing the cognitions of individual group members. As yet, we 
have very little understanding of how these various levels interact to shape and constrain the profile 
of collective cognition. Most studies limit their attention to one particular level of analysis; however, 
it seems likely that multi-level models and simulations will be required to reveal the true nature of 
real-world collective cognitive flux. The NK(C) model explored in this section, with its grounding in 
complexity science and the study of self-organized systems, provides a useful starting point for 
multi-level simulations. In addition, the use of networks to model information flow and influence at 
all levels, establishes a sensible, and potentially productive, linkage with the emerging science of 
networks  (Barabasi,  2002;  Buchanan,  2002;  Watts,  2003).  Together,  we  can  hope  that  such 
approaches will enable us to gain a better understanding of the various forces and factors that shape 
the profile of cognition at both the individual and collective levels.  
Network Structure and Collective Problem Solving 
When thinking about the mental life of human agents, it is common to make a distinction between 
cognitive states and cognitive processes. Cognitive states, like states of belief, are the aspects of our 
mental  life  that  we  typically  recognize  as  the  intermediate  products  of  some  thought  process. 
Cognitive  processes,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the  processes  that  govern  the  transition  between 
cognitive  states.  Cognitive  processes  are  typically  seen  to  involve  some  form  of  information 
processing; i.e. the transformation and manipulation of information-bearing structures. And it is 
cognitive processes, like perception, reasoning, thinking, and the comprehension of language, which 




When it comes to collective cognition, we can continue to make a distinction between cognitive 
states and cognitive processes. Cognitive states, like states of belief, have clearly been the focus of 
the paper thus far. We have thus talked about cognitive states as corresponding to the specific 
configuration of beliefs adopted by particular agents, and we have attempted to provide some 
insight into how such states may be influenced by forces acting at the individual, social and even the 
cultural level. The current section aims to extend the discussion to a consideration of cognitive 
processes in collective (multi-agent or group) situations. But before we embark on this discussion, 
we need to consider what it is that makes a process cognitive, and whether it makes sense to talk of 
cognitive processes as being distributed across the elements of a social network.  
There are, in fact, two possible interpretations of what collective cognitive processing might mean. 
Firstly, we might see collective cognitive processing as consisting of those processes that influence 
the cognition of individual agents. On this view, cognitive processes are the things that go on inside 
the heads of individual agents, and the purpose of multi-agent simulations and group-level analyses 
is to understand how these inner processes are affected by social forces. On the other hand, we 
might see collective cognitive processing as reflecting a commitment to something like distributed 
cognition (Hutchins, 1995). In this case, cognitive processes would be seen as distributed across the 
elements of a social network, with social actors making the same sort of contribution to cognitive 
processing as the neuronal elements of the biological brain make to the cognitive processes of the 
individual agent. In the case of distributed cognition, the interaction of the agents within a social 
network constitutes  the  basis  for  cognitive  processing,  and  cognitive  processes  are  seen  as  the 
properties of the larger system in which agents participate.     
The notion that cognitive processes might be distributed across the elements of a social network, in 
the same way as they are (in the more conventional case) distributed across a nexus of neuronal 
(and perhaps extra-neuronal (see Smart et al., 2010)) elements, is clearly compatible with the claims 
of the distributed cognition movement. However, not everyone is happy to concede that cognitive 
processing is something that can take place outside the heads of individual human agents. Harnad 
and Dror (2006) thus argue: 
“…cognition takes place entirely within the brains of cognizers…The causes and effects 
stretch more distally, but not the cognition; cognition begins and ends at the cognizer‟s 
sensor and effector surfaces.”  
Clearly, what is needed in order to resolve this dispute is some way of determining what makes a 
process cognitive. This would enable us to determine whether the information processing that takes 
place at a collective, multi-agent level is really something that should be seen as a legitimate form of 
cognitive processing. Unfortunately, there has been very little progress in our understanding of what 
constitutes a cognitive process. The main problem is that cognitive processes are often defined by 
ostension. We  can therefore  point  to  specific  examples  of  cognitive  processing  (e.g.  perceiving, 
reasoning,  thinking  and  so  on),  but  establishing  what  it  is  that  makes  something  a  legitimate 
member of the class of cognitive processes is a much more difficult undertaking. Adams and Aizawa 
(2001, 2008) favour a view of cognition that highlights the role of representations with ‘intrinsic’ as 
opposed to ‘derived’ intentionality. Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what is meant by the notion 
of ‘intrinsic intentionality’, or when we confront representations whose content is intrinsically given. 




“one  that:  (i)  is  required  for  the  accomplishing  of  a  cognitive  task,  (ii)  involves 
information processing, and (iii) is of the sort that is capable a yielding a cognitive 
state” (pg. 32).  
In  this  definition,  the  notion  of  a  ‘cognitive  task’  is  defined  by  ostension,  and  the  notion  of  a 
cognitive state is construed as a genuinely representational state; i.e. a state that can be seen as 
representational in virtue of its satisfaction of a host of additional criteria. The main problem here, 
of course, concerns the fact that we are still relying on ostensive definitions for the notion of a 
cognitive task. We also encounter problems with respect to the precise conditions under which a 
physical state should count as one that is ‘genuinely representational’. Perhaps, as Clark (2010) 
suggests,  the  best  that  we  can  do  in  this  case  is  to  define  a  cognitive  process  in  terms  of  its 
behaviour-supporting role. That is, a cognitive process should be defined with respect to the kinds of 
behaviours that it makes possible: 
“What makes a process cognitive, it seems to me, is that it supports genuinely intelligent 
behaviour....To  identify  cognitive  processes  as  those  processes,  however  many  and 
varied, that support intelligent behaviour may be the best we can do.” (Clark, 2010, pg. 
92-93) 
Of course, this definition leaves the notion of what constitutes ‘intelligent behaviour’ uncomfortably 
vague,  and  it  also  fails  to  address  the  issue  of  whether  cognitive  processes  can  be  socially 
distributed. Thus, if we see intelligent behaviour as the behaviour of a specific individual, then it is 
not clear whether the actions of other individuals should really count as part of the processing that 
makes  such  behaviour  possible.  Smart  et  al  (2010),  for  example,  talk  about  the  way  in  which 
scientific  open  access  initiatives
12,  in  conjunction  with  global  information  networks,  serve  to 
facilitate creative insight and intellectual progress in the domain of scientific endeavour. As Har nad 
(1999) rightly notes, systems like the World  Wide Web enable us to accomplish something akin to 
‘scholarly  skywriting’  –  scientific  theories,  thoughts,  ideas,  experimental  results,  and  sometimes 
data, are made available in ways that are increasingly accessible to fellow academics and scientific 
colleagues. Should the collective actions of the scientific community, in this case, count as part of 
the cognitive processing substrate that makes possible the pursuit of productive shifts in individual-
level thinking? 
For the purposes of the current paper, we propose to view collective cognitive processing as a form 
of distributed cognition. That is, we see cognitive processes as things that can be distributed across 
the elements of a social network, and we see interacting agents as potentially contributing to the 
collective realization of these processes. This position enables us to see the coordinated behaviour 
of multiple agents as constituting a form of cognitive processing; it enables us, in essence, to see 
social networks as part of the material fabric that makes collective cognition possible.   
One study which has attempted to examine collective cognitive processing in network contexts is 
Mason et al (2005). Unlike many of the studies discussed so far, Mason et al (2005) used human 
subjects rather than synthetic agents. They attempted to examine the ability of groups of networked 
human subjects to collectively explore a problem space and find optimal solutions within that space. 
The subjects had to guess a number between 0 and 100, and they were awarded points based on a 
                                                           




score associated with that number. A continuous ‘fitness’ function determined the score associated 
with each number, but this function was not made available to subjects. Instead, on any given round 
of the experiment, subjects had to choose a number based on the feedback they received from both 
their own guesses and the guesses of their immediate neighbours. Thus, in a totally connected 
network (see Figure 5), each subject could see the scores associated with the guesses of all other 
participants, and they could (if they so wished) choose to imitate successful neighbours by copying 
their  guesses  on  subsequent  rounds.  Collective  problem-solving  performance  was  assessed  by 
calculating the average score of subjects on each round of the experiment. Thus, in order to be 
successful, subjects had to explore the structure of the fitness landscape, as provided by the fitness 
function, and rapidly converge on the most optimal solution (i.e. number) available. The cognitive 
process  in  question  is  thus  a  form  of  collective  problem-solving  in  which  the  search  efforts  of 
multiple individuals are pooled to create a measure of collective cognitive success (i.e. the ability of 
the group to find an optimal solution).   
In order to assess the effect of network structure on problem-solving performance, Mason et al 
(2005)  organized  the  human  subjects  into  communication  networks  with  different  structural 
topologies  (see  Figure  5).  As  just  mentioned,  in  the  totally  connected  network  condition,  each 
participant could see the solutions proposed by all other participants as well as the fitness score 
associated with their solutions; in other network conditions, each participant could only see the 
solutions and scores of a more limited number of individuals, namely those individuals to which they 
were directly connected. The question we can now ask is how will the nature of the communication 
network influence the collective problem-solving behaviour (and performance) of the participants? 
How, in other words, will network structure affect the performance profile of collective problem-
solving?  
What Mason et al (2005) found was that in conditions where there was a single local optima (i.e. a 
fitness  landscape  with  a  single  peak),  the  network  structures  that  supported  the  most  rapid 
dissemination of information were the most successful. Thus, when the fitness landscape had a 
single  peak,  subjects  tended  to  converge  more  quickly  on  the  global  maximum  in  the  totally 
connected, small world and random network topology conditions. This result is explained in terms of 
the speed at which information is spread through the network. Thus, in the single peaked condition, 
each solution with a higher score provides information about the best direction for future search 
efforts (all routes uphill lead to the same optimal solution), and, as such, it is helpful to have a 
situation whereby information about the results of collective search efforts are distributed as widely 





Figure 5: Examples of the network structures used by Mason et al (2005).  
Things are very different, however, when the fitness landscape has a more rugged, multi-modal 
structure; i.e. when there are multiple local optima (and one global optima). In this case, we might 
expect rapid information dissemination to once again result in rapid convergence on a particular 
solution,  but  whether  this  solution  is the  best  one  available  depends  largely  on  how  lucky the 
participants are with their initial guesses. If the participants refrain from converging too quickly on a 
particular solution, they might discover a more globally-optimal solution, and it is for this reason that 
we might expect network structures that  limit the rate of information dissemination to benefit 
collective problem-solving performance.   
This is pretty much what Mason et al (2005) discovered. They found that when a multi-peaked 
solution landscape was used, participants found the global solution most quickly in the small-world 
network  condition.  The  topology  of  the  small-world  network  seemed  to  provide  just  the  right 
amount of social influence for optimal performance – it supported a certain amount of independent 
exploration, but it did not inhibit rapid convergence on optimal solutions. As Mason et al (2005) 
comment:  
“In  the  small-world  network...the  participants  were  segregated  into  different  spatial 
regions,  but  the  information  could  travel  quickly  through  „short-cuts‟,  allowing  for 
different locally-connected groups to explore various regions of the problem space. Thus, 
while one locally connected group might latch onto a local maximum, the small-world 
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topology decreases the probability that everyone will follow their lead before another 
sub-group finds the global maximum. Once any subgroup finds the global maximum, the 
information can spread quickly to other subgroups...”    
Results similar to Mason et al (2005) have also been reported by Lazer and Friedman (2006, 2007), 
this  time  using  experiments  involving  synthetic  agents.  As  with  Mason  et  al  (2005),  Lazer  and 
Friedman (2006, 2007) also examined the effect of network structure on collective problem-solving 
performance using a search task. However, in this case, the search task consisted of a search for 
optimal solutions using the NK model paradigm discussed earlier in this paper. A specific NK model 
(N=20, K=5) was used to generate a fitness landscape, and agents were required to explore the 
landscape by generating variants of the 20 bit design solution. At the beginning of each simulation, 
agents  were  randomly  assigned  locations  on  the  fitness  landscape,  and  at  each  round  of  the 
simulation they could explore the local terrain of the landscape by randomly switching one of the 
binary variables associated with their current solution. This modification to a single binary variable 
provided  information  about  the  relative  fitness  of  neighbouring  solutions  and  thus  indicated 
whether fitter alternatives were available. In addition to receiving information about the fitness of 
their own solutions, agents also received information about the fitness of solutions as proposed by 
their network neighbours (i.e. the agents to whom they were directly connected). If a neighbouring 
agent proposed a solution that was fitter than either the agent’s current solution or their modified 
solution, then the agent adopted the solution of its neighbour.   
Using this procedure, Lazer and Friedman (2006, 2007) discovered a trade-off between what they 
called  exploration  and  exploitation.  Exploration  here  is  the  tendency  of  agents  to  explore  the 
solution space independently of other agents, and exploitation is the tendency of agents to adopt 
the  solutions  proposed  by  other  agents.  The  result  of  this  trade-off  is  a  profile  of  topology-
dependent performance in which networks with low average path lengths (e.g. totally connected 
networks) yield better performance in the short-term (compared to networks with higher average 
path lengths (e.g., linear networks)), but worse performance in the longer term (again compared to 
networks with higher average path lengths). We can make sense of this pattern of results if we think 
of the agents as a bit like explorers parachuted into a mountainous landscape at night, equipped 
with radios, flashlights and altimeters. Imagine that the goal of each explorer is to find the highest 
peak in the landscape, and thus all explorers begin to move uphill as soon as they touchdown. As 
they  move  ever  upward,  the  explorers  can  communicate  with  each  other  using  their  radios, 
reporting the results of their altimeter readings. And if agents hear that one of their colleagues has 
found a higher point on the landscape, then they all converge on that location and begin searching 
from that particular point. Networks that support full two-way radio communication between all the 
explorers (i.e. totally connected networks) deliver a profile of good short-term, but poor long-term 
performance: all agents rapidly converge on the highest location found at the outset of the search, 
but given the rugged nature of the terrain the highest initial location is not necessarily the one that 
leads directly to the highest peak. If one agent lands on the top of a small hill, and all the other 
agents land at the base of a separate, taller hill, then all agents will move to the top of the small hill 
and remain there; they will fail to discover the most optimal solution (the peak of the tall hill) 
because the agent atop the small hill will communicate a higher altimeter reading, and all agents will 
immediately converge on that location. If the rate at which explorers can exchange information is 




the distracting influence of other agents and potentially discover heights that are much loftier than 
those that might otherwise have been discovered.  
The results of studies exploring the effect of network structure on collective search tasks thus points 
to  a  common  conclusion:  different  types  of  network  topology  can  affect  the  rate  at  which 
information propagates within a problem-solving community, and this can compromise a group’s 
ability to discover globally-optimal, long-term solutions. When the network topology supports rapid 
rates of information transfer, individuals may be inclined to settle on sub-optimal solutions on the 
basis of initial shared information. Such results may be of considerable significance when it comes to 
understanding a range of phenomena such as groupthink (Janis, 1982), production blocking (Diehl & 
Stroebe, 1987) and the common knowledge effect (Stasser & Titus, 1985)
13, all of which seem to be 
characterized by a group’s inability to find optimal solutions based on some form of precipitant 
interaction or early information sharing.  
Of course, the implications of Mason et al’s (2005) and Lazer and Friedman’s (2007) findings should 
not be over-stated. The results are important in terms of contributing to our understanding of the 
relationship between network structure and collective problem-solving; however, the conclusions 
we can make from such research findings are limited in a number of ways. Firstly, the results do not 
reveal  that  a  particular  pattern  of  network  connectivity  will  always  deliver  the  same  profile  of 
performance, even when the nature of the problem-solving tasks resembles that used in the studies. 
The reason for this is that the primary determinant of collective performance seems to be the rate at 
which information is disseminated, coupled with the tendency of agents to always copy superior 
solutions. This particular profile of rapid information dissemination and high social influence may be 
seen in some problem-solving contexts, but, in the real world, technological and social factors will 
often conspire to undermine the actual rate of information flow and influence  through a social 
network. Thus, inter-agent influence may be undermined if superior solutions cannot be copied 
because of copyright laws or patents. Moreover, just because a network structure supports rapid 
information  dissemination  this  does  not  mean  that  the  actual  flow  of  information  through  the 
network must be necessarily rapid. Agents or nodes within the network can effectively modulate the 
speed  at  which  information  is  transmitted  by  selectively  ignoring,  or  by  only  intermittently 
processing, information. In human social networks, there are clearly a variety of factors that might 
contribute to the rate of information distribution. These include things such as the tendency to 
hoard information, willingness to cooperate, vulnerability to copying/transmission errors
14, and the 
level of trust between neighbouring actors. Also, of course, in situations involving mobile ad hoc 
                                                           
13 Hinsz, Tindale and Vollrath (1997) have also highlighted some of the dangers associated with a group’s over-
reliance on shared information. Such insights, in combination with the results reported here, should give us 
pause  for  thought  when  it  comes  to  notions  of  shared  situation  awareness  (Nofi,  2000)  and  shared 
understanding  (Smart  et  al.,  2009a).  Inasmuch  as  the  interventions  used  to  enhance  shared  situation 
awareness and shared understanding depend on the sharing of common sets of information, it is important 
that we do not create a situation in which group-level problem-solving abilities are undermined as a result of 
the attempt to achieve some other human factors objective. 
14 Lazer & Friedman (2007) evaluated the impact of copying errors in their computer simulation studies. They 
report that, in the long-run, systems with high error rates in the copying process outperformed those in which 
copying errors were minimized. The explanation for these results seems to be the same as that proposed for 
the  effect  of  network  structure  on  performance,  namely  that  “Error  rates  in  copying….alter  the  balance 
between exploration and exploitation in the system, increasing the amount of experimentation but reducing 




networks  (MANETS),  many  nodes  may  be  expected  to  have  only  occasional  or  intermittent 
connectivity, and this may impede the effective rate of information spread through the network
15.  
A second limitation of the studies reviewed in this section concerns the nature of the problem -
solving task used to explore collective problem-solving. It should be clear that the search tasks used 
by Mason et al (2005) and Lazer and Friedman (2007) are only one type of task that could be used to 
study collective problem-solving. Many types of real world collaborative problem -solving involve 
significant amounts of specialization in which agents work on particular parts of a problem and then 
attempt to coordinate their activities with respect to some larger, ov erarching problem-solving 
objective. It seems unlikely that the results of Mason et al (2005) and Lazer and Friedman (2007) can 
generalize to these more differentiated and hierarchically -structured  tasks,  because  such  tasks 
feature complex inter-dependencies between the behaviours of particular agents. In the case of the 
search tasks, the success of one particular agent has no effect on the success of any other agent, and 
thus the solutions proposed by one agent are independent of all the others.  However, some of the 
most interesting cases of real-world collaborative problem-solving, such as military planning, involve 
situations  where the suitability of candidate solutions  as  proposed by one agent are  heavily 
dependent on the solutions proposed by other agents. In cases like hierarchical military planning, we 
therefore  seem  to confront a situation that is more akin  to  the notion of  the  coupled fitness 
landscapes discussed in relation to the NK(C) model. In this case, the  topographic structure of the 
fitness landscape for one part of the  problem is systematically deformed  whenever solutions for 
other parts  of the problem   are proposed.  The upshot is that it seems unclear whethe r the 
conclusions of Mason et al (2005) and Lazer and Friedman (2007), made in the context of collective 
search tasks, can be extended to other types of collective problem-solving. Further work needs to be 
undertaken in order to examine this issue.  
A final concern regarding the studies reviewed in this section conc erns the nature of the putative 
cognitive processes that are being explored. Inasmuch as we can say that the studies are exploring a 
process that is distinctly cognitive in nature, albeit one that is obviously distributed across multiple 
agents, then it is clear that w e are dealing with a  cognitive process that is unlike, say, memory, 
reasoning or perception. To say that the studies of  Mason et al  (2005) and Lazer and Friedman 
(2007) provide some general insight into the nature of network-enabled socio-cognitive processing, 
we therefore need to be able to extend the work to other types of collective cognitive processing. 
One example here might be to look at the effect of network structure on distributed memory 
processes. A number of studies have sought to examine memory in a social context, looking at  the 
role of social influence and interaction on the processes of encoding, recall and contagion  (see 
Barnier et al., 2008, for a review). Few studies, however, have systematically explored the effect of 
communication network structure on  the social distribution of memory processes. Given the clear 
role that networks play  in constraining the opportunities for inter-agent interaction and influence, 
                                                           
15 This should give us pause for thought when it comes to considering the apparent limitations of MANETS. 
Rather than see intermittent connectivity as an unfortunate side-effect of the current capabilities of wireless 
technology,  something  to  be  eliminated  by  future  design  efforts,  the  current  set  of  results  casts  the 
connectivity profile of MANETS in a more positive light. If intermittent or periodic connectivity effectively 
retards the rate at which information is transmitted, then it seems entirely possible that, at least in some 
contexts,  the  connectivity  profile  of  MANETS  may  have  adaptive  value.  Rather  than  exerting  a  uniformly 
negative  effect  on  collective  cognition,  connectivity  limitations  may  sometimes  play  an  important  role  in 
helping a community of problem-solving agents come to a high quality cognitive outcome (for example, a 




we might expect to see a number of interesting results once we think about collective memory (and 
other types of collective cognitive processing) from a network-oriented perspective.     
Exploring the Effect of Dynamic Networks on Collective Problem Solving 
Network structures that promote the rapid dissemination of information have, we saw, a worrying 
tendency to impair collective cognitive performance, in at least some problem-solving contexts. In 
particular, as the structure of the solution landscape becomes progressively more rugged, and the 
complexity of the problem to be solved becomes correlatively more complex, the rate of information 
dissemination  seems  to  become  increasingly  important  in  determining  the  final  outcome  of 
collective  processing.  Networks  that  facilitate  the  rapid  transfer  of  information  between  the 
elements of a social network can, it seems, result in precipitant forms of information sharing which 
result in premature convergence on a sub-optimal solution.  
One way of addressing this problem, of course, is to enforce structural change in the social network, 
modifying the network topology in ways that effectively reduces the rate at which information is 
disseminated. However, rapid information dissemination is not always a bad thing. In some cases, as 
when the solution landscape is relatively smooth and there is a single global optimum, then rapid, 
widespread communication may actually benefit collective problem-solving performance. Arguably, 
what is required is some way of dynamically adapting the network structure to suit the nature of the 
problem-solving  task  confronting  a  community  of  agents.  Instead  of  searching  for  a  network 
structure that is uniformly beneficial for collective problem-solving, perhaps we need to think more 
about dynamic networks, networks that dynamically and adaptively modify their  connectivity in 
response to the demands of specific problems. In fact, there are compelling reasons to think that a 
more  adaptive  and  dynamic  approach  to  structural  change  might  benefit  collective  cognitive 
performance. As we will see in subsequent sections, networks may best support cognition (at both 
the individual and collective level) by a process of what we refer to as ‘adaptive coupling’; i.e. the 
temporally-specific coupling of various resources into a flexibly-configured and dynamically-bounded 
cognitive system
16. 
Many studies that aim to  investigate the  patterns of information flow and influence in social 
networks do so using networks with fixed, static topologies. There is no reason, however, to assume 
that such networks necessarily exhaust the space of cognitively-interesting network simulations, or 
even that such networks necessarily represent the kind of networks typically encountered in cases of 
much real-world cognitive processing. As such, in this section, we report the results of a preliminary 
attempt  to  evaluate  the  contribution  of  dynamic  networks  (network s  whose  structural  and 
functional topology changes throughout the course of cognitive processing) to collective cognition. 
The specific aim  of the study was  to investigate the impact of constructive changes to a network 
(realized by the progressive addition of links) on collective problem-solving performance. The study 
relied on the same problem-solving paradigm as that used by Lazer and Friedman (2007), and the NK 
models were of the same complexity; i.e. all simulations used NK models with parameters of  N=20 
and K=5. These parameters yield fitness landscapes that are moderately rugged, with a few hundred 
local optima  and high correlations between proximate solutions . As  Lazer and Friedman  (2007) 
                                                           
16 The notion of adaptive coupling thus goes hand-in-hand with the notion of cognitive extension (Clark, 2008),  
according to which non-biological elements can sometimes constitute part of the mechanistic substrate of a 




comment, these kind of problem spaces probably best capture “the essence of most interesting 
problems that individuals and organizations in the real world face—rugged, but not chaotic” (pg. 
674).  Before  running  the  simulations,  1000  different  NK  models  were  generated  using  the 
aforementioned parameters. These 1000 models were  then used in experimental simulations in 
which a collection of agents (population=100)  were tasked with the exploration of the problem 
space and the discovery of optimal solutions. The experiment involved the manipulation of two 
independent variables: Network Growth Rate (NGR) (which represents the rate at which links are 
added to the network) and Network Growth Delay Period (NGDP) (which represents the period that 
must elapse before the first link is added to the network). In total there were 7 levels of the NGR 
variable and 6 levels of the NGDP variable, giving a total of (7*6) 42 experimental conditions. Within 
each condition, the 100 agents were tested against the same set of 1000 NK models (i.e. the same 
set of 1000 NK models were used for each condition), resulting in a total of 1000 simulations for 
each condition (i.e. a total of 1000*42 = 42,000 simulations). At the beginning of each simulation, 
none  of  the  agents  were  connected  (i.e.  there  were  no  links  between  any  of  the  agents),  but 
throughout the course of each simulation links were added in order to connect the agents together 
into networks of increasing density (see Figure 6). As is indicated by Figure 6, the networks in this 
study  were  generated  in  a  particular  way.  Links  were  added  to  the  agent  community  by  first 
selecting an agent at random from the total population of 100 agents. A second agent was then 
selected (again at random) from the subset of agents that were already connected to at least one 
other agent (i.e. the agent possessed at least one link). The two agents were then connected via the 
addition of a link
17. The network growth law in this study is thus a form of preferential attachment 
(of unconnected nodes to connected ones), but th ere is no bias towards connecting to nodes that 
have a particular number of links (e.g. the most links)
18. 
Each  simulation was completed when  at least  one  of the  following  termination  conditions was 
encountered: 
1.  1500 processing cycles had elapsed, or 
2.  all possible links had been added to the network and the network was thus fully connected, 
or 
3.  all the agents were connected into a single network component, they had all converged on a 
common solution, and at least 20 processing cycles had elapsed with no new solutions being 
generated by any of the agents
19. 
The rate at which links were added  to the emerging network  depended on the value of the NGR 
variable for the specific experimental condition, and the cycle at which the first link (or set of links) 
was added depended on the value of the NGDP variable. Thus, if the NGR variable was set to 1.0 and 
                                                           
17 This is why, in Figure 6, we see the emergence of a single network component after the addition of only 100 
links. 
18 Clearly, there a number of ways in which the agent network could be generated. These alternative growth 
laws are the subject of ongoing investigations. 
19  On each processing cycle, a n agent selects one element of the 20 -bit solution string with which it is 
associated at random. This means that over the course of a 20 -cycle period an individual agent may fail to 
completely explore all neighbouring solutions (i.e. they may fail to select some elements of the 20-bit solution 
string). However, because condition 3 is based on the fact that we are considering the solutions generated by 
all the agents (and all the agents have converged on a common solution), then the chance that the agents will 




the  NGDP  variable  was  set  to  50,  then  the  first  link  would  be  added  on  the  50
th  cycle  of  the 
simulation, and 1 link would be added to the ‘network’
20 every cycle thereafter. The levels of the 
NGR variable used in this study were 0.1 (1 link added every 10 cycles), 0.2 (1 link added every 5 
cycles), 0.5 (1 link added every 2 cycles), 1 (1 link added every cycle), 2 (2 links added every cycle), 5 
(5 links added every cycle) and 10 (10 links added every cycle). The levels of the NGDP variable were 
0 (no delay period), 10 (a delay period of 10 cycles), 20 (a delay period of 20 cycles), 30 (a delay 
period of 30 cycles), 40 (a delay period of 40 cycles) and 50 (a delay period of 50 cycles).  
 
Figure 6: Figure showing the progressive addition of links during the early stages of a simulation. 
The graphics numbered 1 to 6 show the 100 agents (represented as nodes) at the outset of the 
simulation (tile 1) when none of the agents are connected, and at the 100
th processing cycle (tile 6) 
when all the agents are connected into a single network component. The color coding of the nodes in 
these tiles indicates the value of the solution associated with each agent, with orange/yellow values 
indicating poor solutions and purple/red values indicating good solutions. As can be seen from the 
figure, the agents in the simulation gradually discover progressively better solutions throughout the 
course of the simulation. 
At the start of each simulation, each of the 100 agents was assigned to a particular solution within 
the NK model space selected for the simulation. Agents were assigned the same value for each NK 
model, thus the starting point for each agent in each NK model across all experimental conditions 
was the same. The simulation then consisted of a number of processing cycles during which the 
following steps were applied to each agent (X):  
1)  the current solution (S) for X was compared to all the solutions of X’s immediate neighbours 
in the network (if they had any) 
                                                           
20 Obviously, the term ‘network’ is something of a misnomer here. Until sufficient links have been added, the 











2)  if the solution of a neighbouring agent was found to be better than S, then X adopted the 
solution of its neighbour  
3)  if none of the solutions of X’s neighbours were better than S, then X modified S (by randomly 
selecting and flipping one of the 20 binary values comprising S) to generate a new solution 
(S')  
4)  if S' was better than S, then X adopted S' as its current solution; otherwise, X adopted S as its 
current solution  
Each simulation was run until one of the aforementioned termination conditions had been reached.  
 
Figure 7: Average performance over 1000 simulations in networks with growth rates of 0.1 (1 link 
added every 10
th cycle), 0.2 (1 link added every 5 cycles), 0.5 (1 link added every 2 cycles) and 1 (1 
link added every cycle). The lines on each chart show the effect of the initial delay period, with longer 
delays causing a rightward shift in the performance curves (see Figure 8 for a legend).    
Figure 7 and Figure 8 summarize the results obtained from this experiment. Both figures show the 
average performance of agents over the course of successive processing cycles for different levels of 
the NGR and NGDP variables. The average performance is calculated as the average score associated 
with the solutions adopted by all agents averaged across all the agents within a particular cycle (100 
data  points)  and  across  all  the  simulations  within  a  particular  treatment  condition  (1000  data 




while Figure 8 shows the results obtained for the remaining levels (i.e. 2, 5 and 10). What these 
figures appear to show is that as the rate of network growth increases (i.e. as the rate at which links 
are added to the network increases), the length of the simulation decreases (i.e. the number of 
cycles  that  must  elapse  before  one  of  the  termination  conditions  is  encountered  is  reduced). 
However, as the rate at which links are added is increased, the final performance of the agents (the 
quality of the final solution) also becomes more variable, with performance apparently negatively 
affected in conditions involving both high growth rates and shorter delay intervals. The effect of the 
initial delay interval, therefore, seems to be that it offsets a growth rate-related decline in collective 
problem-solving  performance.  Furthermore,  at  each  level  of  the  NGR  variable,  the  effect  of 
increasing  the  initial  delay  period  seems  to  be  a  shift  in  the  performance  curve  to  the  right, 
particularly during the middle part of the simulation. Thus for cycles in the middle of a simulation, 
the effect of the delay interval is to reduce the quality of the solutions found by agents; however, by 
the end of the simulation this performance deficit is eliminated. In fact, for the higher growth rate 
conditions, the slight performance deficit seen during the middle of the simulation is reversed at the 
conclusion  of  the  simulation,  with  higher  levels  of  performance  being  seen  in  the  conditions 
involving longer initial delay periods.  
 
Figure 8: Average performance over 1000 simulations in networks with growth rates of 2 (2 links 
added every cycle), 5 (5 links added every cycle) and 10 (10 links added every cycle). The lines on 
each chart show the effect of the initial delay period, with longer delay periods progressively shifting 




These conclusions are backed up by the statistical analysis of the simulation data. Firstly, a two-way 
(7*6) between subjects factorial ANOVA on the performance scores associated with solutions at the 
end of the simulations revealed a significant interaction between the NGR and NGDP variables (F(30, 
41958) = 148.629, P < 0.001) and significant main effects for both the NGR (F(6, 41958) = 1218.754, P < 
0.001) and NGDP variables (F(5,  41958) = 538.756, P < 0.001). Figure 9 illustrates the average final 
performance score obtained in the various experimental conditions. As can be seen from the figure, 
an increase in NGR results in a progressive deterioration of performance, and this deterioration 
seems to be most pronounced for conditions involving shorter initial delay periods. An analysis of 
simple main effects at the levels of the NGR variable reveals that differences between the various 
delay period conditions begin to emerge at growth rates of 0.5 links per cycle and above (i.e. NGR = 
0.5).  Thus  the  performance  differences  between  NGDP  conditions  at  the  0.5  level  of  the  NGR 
variable were statistically significant (F(5,  41958) = 3.091, P < 0.01), but below this level (i.e. growth 
rates  of  less  than  0.5  links  per  cycle)  there  were no  significant  differences between  the  NGDP 
conditions.  
 
Figure 9: Average performance scores for all experimental conditions at the end of the simulations. 
The numbers next to the lines on the chart represent the levels of the NGDP variable. Thus the line 
labeled „0‟ represents the data obtained in conditions with an initial delay period of zero (i.e. NGDP 
= 0). 
Besides the ability of higher initial delay periods to attenuate a growth rate-related decline in final 
performance scores, Figure 9 also suggests that performance was negatively affected by the slowest 
rate of network growth rate (i.e. NGR = 0.1). A one-way ANOVA comparing the performance data for 
various levels of the NGR variable revealed a significant difference between the NGR group means 
(F(7,  41993) = 962213.491, P < 0.001), and post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant 










when compared to intermediate levels of the NGR variable (i.e. growth rates between 0.2 and 2.0). 
The reason for this performance deficit at very slow rates of network growth is probably attributable 
to the termination conditions established for the current study. One of the termination conditions, 
recall, was about the maximum number of processing cycles that could be run in a single simulation. 
At very slow rates of growth it appears that the agent community did not have sufficient time to 
reach the same levels of performance as seen at intermediate rates of growth. This interpretation is 
supported by an inspection of the performance data for the NGR = 0.1 condition (see Figure 7). From 
Figure 7 we can see that by the 1500
th cycle, the performance of agents had not quite reached the 
levels that we see in the NGR = 0.2 and NGR = 0.5 conditions. The relatively poor performance of 
agents in the slowest growth rate condition therefore appears to be an artefact of the specific 
termination conditions used for the current study.  
In order to compare the performance of dynamic and static networks, we ran an additional series of 
simulations  involving  static  networks.  A  single  network  was  generated  by  adding  links  to  a 
population  of  100  agents  until  a  single  network  component  had  formed
21.  The performance of 
agents  within  this  static  network  was  then  assessed  by  running  1000  simulations  using  the 
aforementioned NK models. The results of this additional mani pulation are shown in Figure 10. As 
can be seen from the figure, the agents settle on a stable solution very quickly – after about only 15 
cycles. This contrasts with the results seen in dynamic networks where it typically took much longer 
for  the  dynamic  networks  to  settle  on  a  common  solution.  The  most  notable  result  from  this 
manipulation,  however,  concerns  the  final  performance  of  the  agents.  In  the  fixed  network 
condition, the final performance of the agents reached a value considerably below that seen with 
dynamic networks, even when compared with the highest growth rate condition (i.e. 10 links added 
every cycle)
22. The results of a one-way between subjects ANOVA on the performance data for the 
static network condition and the performance data obtained in the highest NGR condition  (i.e. NGR 
= 10) revealed a significant dif ference between the  various conditions (F(7,  6993) = 48537.010, P < 
0.001).  Post  hoc  comparisons  between  the  conditions  using  Tukey's  HSD  test  revealed  that  all 
dynamic networks outperformed the static network  (see Figure 11). We therefore arrive at the 
conclusion that problem-solving performance is enhanced in networks with dynamic, incremental 
topologies, relative to networks with fixed, static topologies. 
                                                           
21 Because the method used for generating the static network was the same as that used to generate networks 
in the dynamic conditions, a single network component emerged only after the addition of 100 links. 
22 The average performance of the dynamic networks used in this study is also greater than the performance of 





Figure 10: Average performance over 1000 simulations in a network with a fixed topology. 
 
Figure 11: Graph showing the final performance scores associated with static and dynamic networks. 
The shaded bars represent conditions featuring dynamic network conditions at various levels of the 
NGDP variable (i.e. delay periods of 0, 10, 20, 30, 40 and 50 cycles). All dynamic networks had a 
growth rate of 10 (i.e. 10 links were added every processing cycle. Post hoc comparisons revealed 
that all dynamic network conditions outperformed the static network condition (P < 0.001).  


















Accounting for this particular pattern of results requires us to think about the effect of time-variant 
changes in network architecture on the opportunities that agents have for independent exploration 
of the solution space. Given what we know about the way in which agents are influenced by the 
superior solutions of connected neighbours, it becomes apparent that the more time agents have to 
independently explore the solution space, the more likely the community is, as a whole, to discover 
the global optimum. We have seen that when agents are connected together in a totally connected 
network, the rate of information dissemination is at its highest, and thus the agents are inclined to 
prematurely settle on a sub-optimal solution (they settle on the most optimal solution found on the 
first  processing  cycle)  (see  Lazer  &  Friedman,  2007).  This explains why,  in the  case of  dynamic 
networks, agents are more likely to prematurely settle on a globally sub-optimal solution in the high 
growth rate conditions: the presence of more and more links across successive processing cycles 
progressively increases the rate at which information is transmitted between the agents. It also 
explains why, in general, we see better performance in dynamic networks than we do in static 
networks (at least static networks that are created using the method described here). In dynamic 
networks, the extent of inter-agent influence is limited; every agent can only influence those agents 
to which they are directly or indirectly connected, and, at least initially, all agents begin with minimal 
influence (i.e. no two agents are connected). This poverty of influence, relative to the situation with 
fully connected networks, means that each agent has time to undertake a local exploration of the 
solution space before reporting the results of this local search to all other agents (when the fully 
connected  network  eventually  emerges).  Incrementally  constructive  networks  therefore  strike  a 
productive balance between autonomy and influence; they give each agent the freedom to search 
for locally-optimal solutions without sacrificing the (eventual) benefits of collective search.  
Two additional phenomena from the aforementioned study now require explanation. One is the 
tendency for increasing initial delay periods to negatively affect performance at the mid-stage of the 
simulation (recall that the performance curve is shifted to the right in most of the high delay period 
conditions (see, for example Figure 8)); the other is the tendency for increases in the initial delay 
period to counteract the deleterious effect of high growth rates on the quality of final solutions. The 
former phenomenon probably stems from the fact that with high initial delay periods agents have 
greater initial autonomy in exploring the solution space. This means they can exhaustively search for 
locally-optimal  solutions  without  being  influenced  by  the  search  results  of  other  agents. 
Unfortunately, however, this freedom comes at a cost, because the average performance of a set of 
disconnected  agents  will  always  be  worse  than  the  average  performance  of  a  fully  connected 
network of agents. When agents are connected, they can share information about the best solution 
currently on offer, which means that all agents can converge on the best solution. When agents are 
disconnected, each can only progress as far as the nearest local optimum. So even if one agent is 
lucky enough to find the global optimum, the average performance of the community will still be 
relatively low.  
In respect of the second phenomenon (the fact that longer initial delay periods attenuate a growth-
related decline in performance), the longer initial delay period supports the greater initial autonomy 
of agents and thus enables them to explore more of the solution space before they converge on a 
common solution. When no delay period exists, agents quickly become interconnected (particularly 
when the growth rate is very high) with the result that they are inclined to prematurely settle on a 
solution that, in all likelihood, is sub-optimal relative to the kind of solution that they could have 




The Cognitive Virtues of Dynamic Networks    
The empirical results presented in the previous section seem to indicate that, when it comes to 
collective  cognitive  processing,  dynamic  networks  can  sometimes  outperform  their  more  static 
counterparts. Clearly these results are, in some sense, specific to the kind of task in which the agents 
are engaged, and we should not necessarily expect the same pattern of results to be obtained in 
other kinds of problem-solving context. Nevertheless, there are reasons to suspect that dynamic 
networks may benefit cognition (more on which below), and this, at the very least, suggests that a 
comparative  analysis  between static  and  dynamic networks  is  something worth  pursuing  in  the 
context of future research.    
Dynamic networks, it is fair to say, have been somewhat neglected by those interested in network-
enabled cognition. Most of the studies reviewed in this paper focus solely on networks with static 
topologies, but this emphasis is arguably at odds with what we see in many real world contexts. In 
the real world, the structure of the network topology is not fixed; rather, it changes throughout the 
course  of  information  processing,  perhaps  in  response  to  information  processing  itself,  or  as  a 
response to natural processes of growth and decay. In the case of socially-distributed cognition 
(where  the  problem-solving  elements  correspond  to  social  actors),  the  structure  of  the 
communication network may vary across many temporal scales. Only in the case of very transient 
episodes  of  information  processing  does  it  make  sense  to  talk  of  networks  in  which  the 
opportunities for information flow and influence between the various agents are fixed for the entire 
course  of  the  problem-solving  process.  In  most  real-world  contexts,  agents  will  (sometimes 
repeatedly) engage and then disengage from a communication network, or they may change their 
profile of connectivity as new social ties are formed and old ones wither away. Even in situations 
where  the  structural  topology  of  a  network  seems  largely  fixed,  this  does  not  mean  that  the 
‘functional’ or ‘effective’ topology of the network is not wildly various. Thus in the case of neural 
information processing what seems to be important is not so much the relatively static hodological 
profile of specific neural circuits, so much as the dynamic patterns of neural activity which such 
circuits  make  possible.  The  distribution  of  various  neurotransmitters  and  neuromodulators 
throughout such circuits seems to enable, on occasion, the effective ‘rewiring’ or ‘reconfiguration’ of 
the  circuits  in  response  to  specific  information  processing  challenges  (Marder  &  Bucher,  2007; 
Selverston,  1995).  Thus  even  in  situations  where  we  encounter  networks  with  largely  static 
topologies,  this  does  not  mean  that  the  ‘effective’  structure  (the  structure  that  realizes  the 
information processing capabilities of the focal network) is not, in some sense, dynamic.   
At  present,  our  understanding  of  the  effects  of  dynamic  changes  in  network  topology  on  the 
cognitive  processing  potential  of  a  network  system  is  somewhat  limited.  However,  there  are  a 
number of reasons to suspect that such effects may be significant. By way of introducing this idea, 
consider the attempt by Jerry Elman (1993) to train an artificial neural network to process complex 
bodies of linguistic information. Elman (1993) was interested in whether a particular type of neural 
network, called  a  recurrent  neural  network  (see  Elman, 1990),  could  be  trained  to  learn  about 
aspects of grammatical structure, such as the ability to learn about verb agreement and clause 
embedding  in  the  sentence  ‘The  girls  whom  the  teacher  has  picked  for  the  play  which  will  be 
produced next month practice every afternoon’ (example from Elman, 1993). The recurrent neural 
network architecture (see Figure 12) combines a standard three-layer feed-forward neural network 




copy the activation pattern of the hidden unit layer and feed it back to the input layer alongside the 
next set of inputs. The result is that recurrent networks can be sensitized to temporal and sequential 
dependencies in the training data, learning to predict, for example, the correct linguistic category of 
missing words when presented with partially complete sentences.   
 
Figure 12: An example recurrent neural network architecture. In each processing cycle, the 
activation values of the hidden units are copied to a separate layer of context units. These values are 
then fed back to the hidden unit layer at the next processing cycle. 
What Elman (1993) aimed to do was examine whether a recurrent neural network could learn about 
the grammatical structure of complex sentences, such as those exhibiting multiple clause embedding 
and long distance dependencies. In particular, the neural network was trained to take one word of a 
sentence at a time and predict what the next word in the sentence might be. As Elman  (1993) 
comments, this task “forces the network to develop internal representations which encode the 
relevant grammatical information” (pg. 5).    
Alas, Elman’s efforts were in vain. The network completely failed to learn about the grammatical 
structure of the complex sentences. Not only did the network fail to develop a fully generalizable 
performance profile, it also failed to adequately master the data on which it was trained. In trying to 
account for these results, Elman (1993) tried an alternative training regime in which the network 
was presented initially with examples of very simple sentences and then exposed progressively to 
more complex ones. The aim was to isolate the point at which the network’s performance broke 
down. At what level of sentential complexity would the network prove incapable of making further 
progress?  
The results from this alternative training regimen were surprising. Elman (1993) discovered that 
when presented with staged training inputs (each increasing in complexity) the network was able to 
realize its original training objectives. Thus, what seems to be important to a network’s ultimate 
ability to learn about grammatically complex sentences is that its training is structured in such a way 
that it is able to learn about the simple cases first. Once the network is proficient in handling these 
these simple cases, it can learn to cope with progressively more complex ones. It is almost as if the 
network’s initial success with the simple cases lays the groundwork for subsequent learning about 
the more complex ones. As Elman (1993) rightly notes, this is an interesting result, in part because it 
seems to align itself well with the developmental profile of young children:  
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“Children do not begin by mastering the adult language in all its complexity. rather, they 
begin with the simplest of structures, and build incrementally until they achieve the adult 
language.”  
By themselves, of course, these results seem hardly relevant to our discussion of dynamic networks; 
however, Elman (1993) went on to explore the effects of a further manipulation that built on the 
results of the staged input case. Rather than impose restrictions on the sequential order of exposure 
to  training  cases,  Elman  (1993)  used  an  incremental  memory  solution  in  which  the  recurrent 
feedback provided by the layer of context units was gradually increased as training progressed
23. The 
effect of this manipulation was to limit the temporal window in wh ich linguistic inputs could be 
processed. It thus forced the network to focus (at least initially) on the  simplest training cases. And 
as the memory provided  by the recurrent units was increased over the course of training,  so the 
network was able to deal with progressively more complex inputs. The effect of the incremental 
memory solution  was thus  the same as that achieved by staged training; it promote d an initial 
undersampling of the training data in such a way that the network’s long-term ability to learn about 
complex regularities was enhanced. As Elman (1993) notes, this is an important discovery because it 
may shed light on the functional significance of a developmental progression in human cognitive 
capabilities. Rather than see the working memory limitations of a young children (see Kail, 1984) as a 
computational shortcoming that needs to be overcome in order to reveal the functional profile of 
adult cognition, Elman’s (1993) findings suggest that such ‘limitations’ may play an important (and 
perhaps indispensable) role in children’s cognitive development:  
“Seen in this light, the early limitations on memory capacity assume a more positive 
character. One might have predicted that the more powerful the network, the greater its 
ability to learn a complex domain. However, this appears not always to be the case. If 
the domain is of sufficient complexity, and if there are abundant false solutions, then the 
opportunities for failure are great. What is required is some way to artificially constrain 
the solution space to just that region which contains the true solution. The initial memory 
limitations fulfil this role; they act as a filter on the input, and focus learning on just that 
subset of facts which lay the foundation for future success.” (pg. 9-10)  
Elman’s (1993) findings thus encourage us to think about the functional significance of what might 
be referred to as a network’s ability to dynamically change the resources that are allocated to 
particular problem-solving processes. The notion of resources here is wide ranging; it can refer 
either to aspects of network architecture (e.g. number of nodes, link topology, etc) or to features of 
network processing (e.g. bandwidth, response latency, resistance to activation, and so on). Relative 
to networks in which such resources are largely fixed and pre-specified, such ‘dynamic networks’ 
may have capabilities that differ in interesting and surprising ways. Indeed, work on neural networks 
suggests that learning can be facilitated by allowing networks to dynamically reconfigure their nodes 
or acquire additional nodes (Ash, 1989; Fahlman & Lebiere, 1990; Schultz & Schmidt, 1991). In 
addition,  techniques  that  reduce  network  size  have  been  shown  to  have  a  positive  impact  on 
network performance, at least in some training contexts. Thus the progressive elimination of nodes 
                                                           
23 It should be clear that this manipulation involves the use of dynamic networks. At earlier stages of the 
training process, the recurrent units are only active for the first few processing cycles of any trial, and they are 
disabled once a certain number of processing cycles is reached. This means that the functional topology of the 
network is effectively changed during the course of sentence processing. The deactivation of the recurrent 




from the hidden unit layer of neural networks forces a neural network to progressively learn a more 
concise characterization of the regularities underlying successful performance in a given problem 
domain (Mozer & Smolensky, 1989a; Mozer & Smolensky, 1989b). Such results may shed light on the 
potential  significance  of  regressive  neural  processes  in  which  an  initial  excess  of  neurological 
resources  are  progressively  pruned  over  the  course  of  neurodevelopmental  timeframes  (e.g. 
Edelman, 1987)
24.    
Dynamic Networks and Adaptive Coupling  
One of the reasons dynamic networks benefit cognitive processing is because they enable the time-
dependent  adaptive  coupling  of  individual  agents  into  larger  networked  ensembles.  We  thus 
encounter what might be called the thesis of adaptive coupling: 
Adaptive  Coupling  Thesis:  In  situations  where  cognitive  outcomes  depend  on  the 
coordinated activity of multiple resources, cognitive performance will benefit from the 
ability  to dynamically  and  flexibly  couple  those  resources  into  transient  networks  of 
information flow and influence. Dynamic networks support the realization of multiple 
time-variant  patterns  of  functional  connectivity,  and  these  enable  the  component 
resources  to  adaptively  coordinate  their  activity  at  critical  junctures  in  a  collective 
problem-solving process.   
The  critical  element  of  this  thesis  is  the  temporal  dependency  of  the  network’s  connectivity 
dynamics. Thus, the root cause of the problems in Lazer and Friedman’s study is not that agents 
shared too much or too little information, it was that information sharing took place at the wrong 
time, relative to the features of the specific problem that was being solved. When the structure of 
the solution landscape is relatively smooth, it benefits agents to rapidly exchange information as 
widely as possible; however when the structure of the solution landscape is chaotic, it benefits 
agents to engage in a period of initial exploration followed by subsequent pooling of search results. 
The key point here is that what counts is the temporal profile of inter-agent information exchange – 
the adaptive, time-variant coupling of agents into highly configurable nexuses of information flow 
and influence.    
As a means of further exemplifying the importance of time-variant adaptive coupling in collective 
problem-solving  performances,  consider  the  case  of  collective  problem-solving  described  by  the 
cognitive  anthropologist,  Edwin  Hutchins  (1995).  Hutchins  (1995)  investigated  the  collective 
problem-solving capabilities of networked communities of simple agents. The agents in Hutchins’ 
study  were  simple  neural  networks,  known  as  constraint  satisfaction  networks.  A  constraint 
satisfaction network comprises a number of processing units linked by either inhibitory or excitatory 
connections. The processing units in Hutchins’ study coded for specific environmental features, such 
as ‘is a dog’, ‘barks’, ‘has fur’ and so on, and the units were wired up in such a way that consistent 
features were connected via excitatory links and inconsistent features were connected via inhibitory 
                                                           
24  The  neural  selectionist  account  of  Edelman  (1987)  maintains  that  an  initial  activity-independent 
overproduction  of  synaptic  resources  is  followed  by  a  phase  of  activity-dependent  synaptic  selection  and 
pruning. An alternative view is proposed by Quartz and Sejnowkski (1997) (see also Quartz, 1999). They argue 
for a neural constructivist account in which neural development is driven by an activity-dependent progressive 
elaboration of neural circuits. In either case, what is important for present purposes is the way in which the 
features  of  mature,  adult  cognition  are  progressively  realized  by  dynamic,  activity-dependent  changes  in 




links. Thus the units coding for ‘is a dog’ and ‘barks’ would be connected via excitatory links, while 
the units coding for ‘is a dog’ and ‘meows’ would be connected via inhibitory links. 
As Hutchins points out, once a constraint satisfaction network has been setup it shows properties 
akin to the psychological phenomenon of confirmation bias, which is the tendency to ignore or 
discount evidence that contradicts some initial interpretation of a situation. Thus imagine that a 
particular unit in the constraint satisfaction network is activated, say the unit that codes for the 
feature ‘barks’. Once this unit is activated it will excite some units, such as those coding for ‘is a dog’, 
and inhibit others, such as those coding for ‘meows’. The result will be that the network will settle 
into a consistent ‘interpretation’ of the input data. All the dog-related units will become active, 
reflecting the agent’s interpretation of the input as reflecting the presence of a dog. Importantly, 
once  a  stable  pattern  of activity  has  been  established  by  the  network,  it  can  be  very  hard  for 
alternative interpretations to emerge. Thus if we subsequently present the network with a cat-
related feature (e.g. we activate the unit coding for the feature ‘meows’), what we find is that the 
pattern of activity corresponding to the ‘dog’ interpretation continues to predominate. The network 
has seemingly discounted or ignored evidence that contradicted its initial interpretation of the input 
data. 
In order to explore the effect of inter-agent communication on this behaviour, Hutchins allowed the 
constraint satisfaction networks to communicate the results of their activity to other constraint 
satisfaction networks. What he found was that if the individual agents were allowed to communicate 
with one another from the outset of the simulation, then extreme levels of confirmation bias arose. 
This occurred because each agent, under the influence of information provided by other agents in 
the social network, was under pressure to discover a shared interpretation of the input data. In other 
words, the community of agents strove to find a set of activation patterns that satisfied the internal 
constraints established by inter-agent communication. The result was that agents often failed to give 
due weight to the evidence provided by external input data, and thus, more often than not, the 
community of agents tended to show more extreme forms of confirmation bias than was the case 
with isolated individuals. 
The results of Hutchins’ study thus begins to make contact with what we have seen in other studies, 
such as the performance profile of agents in the totally connected network simulations of Lazer and 
Friedman (2007). In situations where agents are allowed to exchange information with all other 
agents  from  the  outset  of  a  problem-solving  process,  the  result  seems  to  be  a  premature 
convergence on sub-optimal solutions. When inter-agent communication is limited (as in the case of 
linear network configurations or with the dynamic network simulations reported above), collective 
performance typically improves. The pattern of results seen in the studies by Hutchins and Lazer and 
Friedman  are  thus  comparable,  although  clearly  the  problem-solving  processes  confronting  the 
agents are somewhat different (the need to find optimal design configurations in the case of the 
Lazer  and  Friedman  study  versus  the  need  to  accurately  interpret  ambiguous  environmental 
information in the case of Hutchins’ study). In particular, Hutchins found that restrictions in the level 
of initial communication between the agents allowed each agent to establish its own independent 
interpretation of the environmental data, and this resulted in a reduced level of overall confirmation 
bias when communication was subsequently re-established. In essence, when agents were allowed 
to ‘make up their own mind’ as to the most appropriate interpretation of the input data, then the 




external state-of-affairs. What we see, therefore, is an interesting parallel with the earlier studies on 
collective problem-solving. In both cases it seems that there is a delicate and temporally fine-tuned 
balance between initial autonomy and subsequent social influence. When agents are allowed to 
operate independently at the beginning of a problem-solving process, and then later allowed to 
communicate, the result is often a much better profile of collective performance than if extensive 
communication  had  been  permitted  from  the  very  outset  of  the  problem-solving  process.  As 
mentioned above these results are potentially relevant to a range of phenomena seen in group 
problem-solving contexts, e.g. groupthink (Janis, 1982), production blocking (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987) 
and the common knowledge effect (Stasser & Titus, 1985). All these phenomena seem to result from 
precipitant  forms  of  information  sharing  that  are  enabled  by  highly  efficient  communication 
structures. 
Aside from the parallels with Lazer and Friedman’s work, there are also parallels with the work 
reported at the very outset of this paper concerning belief propagation in heterogeneous agent 
communities  (Glinton  et  al.,  2010).  The  task  confronting  agents  in  Hutchins’  study,  recall,  is  to 
establish  an  accurate  interpretation  of  some  external  state-of-affairs  based  on  conflicting  and 
inconsistent environmental information. Inasmuch as we are prepared to see stable patterns of 
network activity in the constraint satisfaction networks as reflecting a particular profile of beliefs 
about the external situation, then the goals of Hutchins’ agents are not that dissimilar from those in 
Glinton et al’s study. We also see some correspondence in terms of the empirical findings of the two 
studies (although clearly much more work needs to be done here). In particular, Glinton et al (2010) 
observed that by manipulating the extent of social influence between the agents, inaccurate belief 
states could sometimes propagate throughout the entire multi-agent system: 
“...it is sometimes the case that significant portions of the team come to have either no 
strong belief or the wrong belief despite overwhelming sensor data to the contrary. This 
is due to the occasional reinforcement of a small amount of incorrect sensor data from 
neighbors, echoing until correct information is ignored.” (Glinton et al., 2010) 
The degree of influence between the agents in Glinton et al’s study thus occasionally inclines the 
entire ensemble of interacting agents to form an inaccurate interpretation of the information they 
are presented with. The same conclusion applies in the case of Hutchins’ study, although in this case 
it is unclear under what conditions the system exhibits the properties of a SOC system. 
It is no doubt tempting, at this point, to come to two conclusions about the notion of adaptive 
coupling on the basis of the evidence presented thus far. The first conclusion is that the adaptive 
coupling process always involves elements that might, in some sense, be seen as internal to the 
network. By this we mean that the elements to be coupled are always those that comprise the focal 
network – neurons in the case of neural networks and social agents in the case of social networks. 
The  second  conclusion  concerns  the  temporal  profile  of  the  coupling  process.  In  this  case,  the 
tendency is probably to see adaptive coupling as characterized by initially low levels of coupling (e.g. 
limited connectivity or influence), followed by progressively higher levels of coupling at later stages. 
Both these conclusions are, we suggest, mistaken. 
As evidence against the first conclusion, recall again the study of Elman (1993) involving recurrent 
neural networks and the processing of grammatically complex sentences. Recall that Elman was able 




show  that  success  in  the  domain  of  complex  grammar  learning  could  only  be  achieved  by 
constraining the sequential order of training cases. Thus simple regularities had to be learned before 
more complex ones; attempts to deal with complex regularities from the outset resulted in the 
network failing to achieve satisfactory levels of performance. Although this case of grammar learning 
might initially appear entirely distinct from the cases of collective problem solving we have reviewed 
elsewhere  in  this  paper,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  multiple  cases  of  poor  performance  have  a 
common  cause.  Thus,  during  training,  Elman’s  network  is  attempting  to  find  an  optimal 
configuration  of  weighting  coefficients  that  will  enable  it  to  achieve  the  desired  input/output 
mapping specified by the training regime. Exposure to the complete set of training cases (comprising 
both  simple  and  complex  sentences)  results  in  the  network  establishing  a  set  of  weights  that 
effectively puts it in the wrong part of the solution landscape, a place from which it is subsequently 
unable to recover. The early exposure to the complex cases thus undermines the ability of the 
network to achieve superior levels of performance in the longer-term; by exposing itself to early 
forms of informational influence (as dictated by the complex cases), the performance profile of the 
network, as a whole, is undermined.   
The precise nature of the adaptive coupling in the case of Elman’s network thus begins to emerge. 
The coupling is not, as we might expect, between the individual elements of the neural network; 
rather, it is between the network and a body of external training data to which the network is 
exposed. When a specific kind of informational contact is established between the network and the 
training data (one that determines the relative influence of simple and complex grammatical forms 
on learning), the network is able to bias its initial explorations of the weight space in such a way that 
it is subsequently able to accommodate the more complex cases from the training set. The right kind 
of  informational  contact, in  this  case,  can  be  established  in  a  number  of  ways:  structuring  the 
training data (with simple cases preceding more complex ones), dynamically changing the network’s 
functional topology during training (e.g. deactivating the context units at various points in time), and 
degrading  the  quality  of  the  training  inputs  via  the  introduction  of  noisy  data.  This  latter 
manipulation, the one relating to noisy input data, may seem like an odd way to establish the right 
kind of informational contact between a neural network and its training environment, but the effect 
is just the same as the other two manipulations. The effect is, in essence, to reduce the effective set 
of  training  data  to  that  which  is  most  suited  to  initial  learning.  Elman  (1993)  describes  the 
introduction of noisy data as a means of preventing the network from prematurely settling on sub-
optimal weighting solutions – ones that effectively prevent the network from forming appropriate 
generalizations later on in training:   
The network‟s learning capacity is greatest at early stages, but this is also the time when 
its training data are most limited, and so the network runs the risk of committing itself to 
the wrong generalization. If the initial data are corrupted by noise, on the other hand, 
the increased variability may retard learning and keep the network in a state of flux until 
it has enough data to make reasonable approximations at the true generalization. (pg. 
17)   
This quotation reveals the subtle correspondence between the case of neural network learning and 
the multiple cases of collective problem-solving reviewed above. In all cases, what seems to emerge 
is  that  initial,  inappropriate  forms  of  information  flow  and  influence  (unrestricted  inter-agent 




Friedman (2007), and exposure to both simple and complex sentences in the case of Elman (1993)) 
are followed by the emergence of particular (sub-optimal) solutions (initial shared interpretations, 
initial design solutions, and initial weight settings) that subsequently preclude the discovery of more 
optimal  solutions  at  a  later  point  in  time  (more  accurate  interpretations,  fitter  solutions,  more 
appropriate weight settings).  
The main point to note from this discussion is that adaptive coupling is not something that need be 
restricted to the internal elements of a network; it can also apply to the external sources of influence 
to which the network is perhaps only occasionally ‘connected’. What is important is not the nature 
of the resources that are actually being coupled together, but the way in which those resources 
participate in the information processing dynamics of a particular cognitive system. 
So much for the view of adaptive coupling as something restricted to the internal elements of a 
network.  What  about  the  view  that  adaptive  coupling  involves  a  specific  temporal  profile  of 
information flow and influence? One reason to doubt the validity of this view comes from a study by 
Clowes  and  Morse  (2005),  which  aimed  to  shed  light  on  the  cognitive  benefits  of  self-directed 
speech. Clowes and Morse (2005) performed simulations in which agents (implemented as simple 
recurrent neural networks) had to move geometric figures to various on-screen locations following 
the presentation of a particular command. The commands were presented to the network using a 
set of specialized ‘word’ units, and the output of these word units (what we might call linguistic 
information) could be fed back to the input layer of the network (via a dedicated re-entrant loop) in 
order to guide subsequent behaviour. 
Clowes and Morse (2005) used a genetic algorithm to train groups of agents under the following 
conditions: 
1)  A control condition in which the dedicated re-entrant loop was disabled. In this condition, 
agents  were  periodically  presented  with  external  commands,  but  there  was  no  internal 
recycling of the linguistic inputs. 
2)  A condition in which the word re-entrance loop was continuously active. In this condition, 
the linguistic inputs were recycled back to the input layer at every processing cycle. 
3)  A condition in which the word re-entrance loop was contingently enabled based on the 
activity of an additional output unit (or gating ‘neuron’). The addition of this unit enabled 
agents to control whether or not linguistic inputs were recycled at the input layer. 
The three conditions thus correspond to situations in which 1) agents ‘hear’ external instructions but 
do not repeat those instructions to themselves (no self-directed speech), 2) agents ‘hear’ external 
instructions  and  continuously  repeat  those  instructions  to  themselves  (continuous  self-directed 
speech), and 3) agents ‘hear’ external instructions and autonomously decide whether or not to 
repeat  those  instructions  back  to  themselves  at  each  processing  cycle  (controlled  self-directed 
speech).  
Clowes and Morse found that in the control condition agents took longer to respond appropriately 
to any of the commands, and they additionally seemed unable to learn how to respond to different 
commands. In the other two conditions, agents were able to learn to respond appropriately to all of 




condition (the one involving self-gated recycling of the linguistic inputs) were particularly successful 
at the task. These agents achieved the best overall performance in terms of evolutionary cost (i.e. 
the agents required the fewest number of generations in order to evolve successful performance 
profiles). The results thus hint at the importance of what Iizuka and Ikegami  (2004) refer to as 
autonomous coupling – the ability of an agent to “spontaneously switch on or off its interaction with 
the environment” (pg. 283). It seems that when agents are allowed to exert some control over the 
extent  to  which  both  internal  and  external  sources  of  information  come  to  influence  overt 
behaviour, then overall performance is enhanced (Clowes & Morse, 2005; Iizuka & Ikegami, 2004). 
This notion of autonomous coupling is thus closely related to the aforementioned notion of adaptive 
coupling. The difference is merely that autonomous coupling assumes that the coupling dynamics 
will be under the control of a specific agent, whereas the notion of adaptive coupling simply assumes 
that the coupling will be of cognitive benefit and makes no assumptions about the locus of control. 
In fact, in situations where there is selective pressure on agents to demonstrate good performance 
(as in the genetic algorithm study of Clowes and Morse), the timing of specific engagements with 
inner  and  outer  sources  of  informational  influence  are  likely  to  be  driven  towards  optimal 
performance. In this case, autonomous coupling benefits overall performance and is synonymous 
with the notion of adaptive coupling. 
We are now in a position to see why the temporal profile of adaptive coupling is unimportant. The 
studies  of  Clowes  and  Morse  (2005)  and  Iizuka  and  Ikegami  (2004)  demonstrate  that  what  is 
important is simply that the opportunity for adaptive coupling is available; the precise temporal 
details concerning the dynamics of the coupling process will largely depend on the nature of the task 
in  which  an  agent  is engaged  (and may even  depend  on  characteristics  of the  particular  agent 
concerned). In the context of collective problem solving, it may sometimes be useful to have a 
period of independent (socially-decoupled) exploration before information exchange takes place. On 
other occasions it may be the initial exposure to other's ideas that sets our thought processes off on 
productive  solo  journeys to  otherwise  unreachable  parts  of  some  intellectual  terrain.  The main 
point, for present purposes, is simply that nothing restricts adaptive coupling to a particular point in 
time. Dynamic networks permit flexible forms of engagement and disengagement with a broad array 
of resources, and what is important for network-enabled cognition is merely the opportunity to 
modify network structures in ways that are adaptively aligned with the goals of both individual and 
collective cognition.  
Future Research 
Previous sections have highlighted a number of areas of research that are relevant to the notion of 
collective cognition. It should be clear, however, that many pressing research issues and questions 
remain. In this section, we present a number of areas for future research in the area of network-
enabled collective cognition.  
Cultural Models and Collective Cognition 
Earlier in the paper we saw that coupled belief systems could be modelled by adopting Kauffman’s 
NK(C)  model  of  co-evolutionary  dynamics.  The  behaviour  of  these  coupled  belief  systems  in 
response to the manipulation of various network-level variables  (e.g. network structure) constitutes 
an obvious target for future research, with a particularly interesting focus of attention being the 




We saw that the cognitive dynamics of individual agents are governed by forces operating at  a 
number of levels: the individual level, the social level and perhaps even the cultural level. This gives 
rise to a rich source of issues to be addressed by future research. The following are just some 
examples: 
1)  How does the profile of inter-agent interaction at the social network level contribute to 
the  emergence,  modification  and  dissolution  of  cultural  groups?  The  aim  here  is  to 
understand how the dynamics of inter-agent interaction (as perhaps determined by time-
variant patterns of functional connectivity at the social network level) contribute to the 
evolution of distinct cultural models. Recall that we can use the methods developed as part 
of  CNA  to  construct cultural  models on  the  basis of  information  about  individual  agent 
beliefs. In the case of our simulation model, we have complete access to the beliefs of all 
agents  in  the  simulation,  and  we  can  thus  automatically  construct  and  modify  cultural 
models  based  on  the  changing  profile  of  beliefs  possessed  by  all  the  agents.  We  now 
encounter  an  interesting  set  of  questions  relating  to  the  emergence  of  distinct  cultural 
models  in  a  multi-agent  system.  If,  for  example,  we  begin  the  simulation  with  multiple 
cultural models (reflecting the presence of culturally-significant groupings of agents), how 
will the cultural models change over time in response to the dynamics of information flow 
and influence at the social network level? Will all agents come to adopt a single model 
(perhaps reflecting a process of cultural convergence or cultural assimilation), or will the 
models merge to form a single hybrid cultural model (perhaps reflecting a process of cultural 
hybridization)? Perhaps the original cultural models will be preserved, but their boundaries 
at the social level will be highly porous (i.e. different agents at different times will switch 
between  different  cultural  communities).  Clearly,  the  combination  of  social  networks, 
coupled belief systems and automated cultural model construction provides us with a rich 
source of simulation opportunities, with potential implications for our understanding of the 
evolution of cultural groups and the dynamics of culturally-entrenched belief systems
25. 
2)  How do social networks affect the vulnerability of cultural groups to cognitive change? The 
idea here is to examine how aspects of the social network (e.g. the network structure) affect 
the susceptibility of a cultural community (the agents associated with a particular cultural 
model) to cognitive change given some particular kind of external perturbation. Perhaps the 
most obvious perturbation here concerns exposure to agents from another cultural group. 
Thus, if a group of agents is exposed to agents associated with another cultural model, will 
they resist ‘conversion’ to the ‘new way of thinking’? And how will this susceptibility to 
conversion relate to the structural features of the social network in which the respective 
groups of agents are embedded?    
3)  How do cultural-level influences affect individual cognitive change?  The aim here is to 
explore the interaction between forces for cognitive change at the individual, social and 
cultural  level.  One  possible  simulation  involves  the  creation  of  additional  sources  of 
                                                           
25 There is an interesting set of questions here regarding the ‘representation’ of cultural groups within the 
social network. For example, one issue of interest concerns the ‘spatial’ distribution of agents from the same 
cultural group within a culturally-heterogeneous social network (i.e. a social network yielding more than one 
cultural model). Members of a particular cultural group may be spatially clustered within the social network, 
with  high  levels  of  connectivity  between  the  group  members,  but  we  can  also  imagine  situations  where 




influence between an individual’s beliefs and the beliefs of the cultural model to which they 
are associated (the influence could be represented via the inclusion of additional epistatic 
linkages, perhaps with higher weightings than those associated with other linkages
26). The 
cultural models could still be subject to automatic creation and modification (as discussed 
above); however, in this case, the cultural models would provide an a dditional source of 
influence on the cognitive dynamics of individual agents  –  agent  cognition  would  be 
influenced by the aggregate beliefs of the cultural group to which they belonged.  
4)  Do  forces  at  the  inter-cultural  level  contribute  to  the  cognitive  stability  of  culturally-
heterogeneous groups? The aim here is to examine the notion that forces operating at the 
cultural  level  (i.e.  the  level  of  cultural  models)  contribute  to  a  form  of  ‘ideological 
equilibrium’ in which the cognitive outlooks of different cultural groups are stabilized by the 
emergence of Nash equilibria at the inter-cultural level.  
Dynamic Networks and Collective Problem-Solving 
The preliminary work on dynamic networks and collective problem-solving reported in this paper 
suggests  that  constructive  networks  could  deliver  performance  benefits,  relative  to  their  more 
statically-configured counterparts. There are clearly a number of ways in which these results could 
be extended. One possible extension concerns the ways in which links are added to the network. 
Thus,  aside  from  the  development  of  randomly-generated  networks  in  which  links  are  added 
between randomly selected nodes, one could imagine ‘growing’ networks using a variety of other 
algorithms, for example, preferential selection processes in which nodes associated with either the 
most links or the fittest solutions are preferentially selected for link attachment.  
Another extension to the work on dynamic networks and collective problem-solving concerns the 
role that ‘information velocity’ plays in determining collective performance. A variety of research 
results  seem  to  suggest  that  highly  efficient  modes  of  inter-agent  communication  (in  which 
information is rapidly disseminated to all parts of a social network) do not necessarily deliver the 
best  long-term  performance  outcomes.  Instead,  more  restricted  modes  of  inter-agent 
communication may be beneficial, at least in some problem-solving contexts. Now, clearly there are 
a number of ways in which the efficiency of inter-agent communication could be affected. One is to 
structure the network in such a way that the rate of information flow and influence is effectively 
reduced; another is to introduce factors that limit the tendency of agents to process or pass on 
information  that  is  supplied  by  their  network  neighbours.  Recall,  for  example,  the  role  that 
conditional probabilities played in influencing the extent of belief propagation through an agent 
network in Glinton et al’s (2010) study. The conditional probabilities reflected the credibility that 
agents assigned to the information supplied by their peers, and this was sufficient to determine the 
extent to which an agent was influenced by its neighbours; i.e. whether it was inclined to revise its 
own belief to match that of its neighbours. The upshot is that credibility judgements contribute to an 
effective  rate  of  information  transmission  that  is  largely  independent  of  the  topological 
characteristics of the network in which such transmission takes place. 
                                                           
26 The basic idea here is to represent the cultural model as the belief system of another agent (a cultural model 
agent), to which all agents in the cultural group are connected. The addition of higher weightings between the 
epistatic ties of individual-level belief structures and cultural-level structures means that the cultural model 




In  human  social  networks  a  variety  of  psychosocial  factors  may  influence  the  effective  rate  of 
information transmission. One such factor is, of course, the level of trust that exists between agents. 
When  agents  have  high  trust  in  one  another,  we  may  expect  them  to  exert  greater  levels  of 
influence than in cases of low trust, and this is likely to mean that information velocity is greater in 
high trust situations. If true, this would hint at a potentially interesting hypothesis concerning the 
adaptive  value  of  distrust  for  collective  problem-solving  performances.  Because  distrust  may 
effectively  retard  the  rate  of  information  dissemination  through  a  network,  collective  problem-
solving performances may be better in situations where agents initially distrust one another, or are 
at least somewhat circumspect about what others tell them. Perhaps a dynamic profile of trust 
evaluation could be imagined in which initially low levels of trust are supplanted by progressively 
greater levels of trust as agents begin to interact and communicate with each other. Such a profile 
would clearly deliver roughly the same kind of pattern of information flow and influence that we see 
in the case of the constructive network simulations reported earlier in this paper
27.  
All of this serves to bring to light a specific hypothesis concerning the adaptive value of evolving trust 
relationships  in  collective  problem -solving  situations.  The  hypothesis  is  that  trust  serves  an 
important role in determining the adaptive coupling of problem -solving agents into increasingly 
close-knit information processing ensembles. Initial lev els of distrust, reflecting perhaps the initial 
caution people bring to  new social situations, are not necessarily  to be regarded as maladaptive 
when it comes to collective problem -solving. Sometimes distrust may play an adaptive role in 
configuring the functional connectivity of  a network in a way that best meliorates   collective 
cognitive processing. In some cases, as in  the case of the working memory limitations of  young 
infants (Kail, 1984) (recall Elman’s (1993) comments in regard to the limited memory solution for 
neural networks), distrust may prevent a community of agents from prematurely converging on a 
sub-optimal solution (Lazer & Friedman, 2007) or forming an inaccurate shared interpretation of 
some external state-of-affairs (Hutchins, 1995). Rather than see distrust as something uniformly 
detrimental to collective cognition – something to be abhorred and ideally eliminated by future 
technological innovation – perhaps we should not be so quick to yield to our intuitions. For there 
may just be a brighter side to distrust. It may be that distrust enables groups to adaptively regulate 
the temporal profile of network-mediated information flow and influence in a way that facilitates 
the long-term realization of high quality collective cognitive outcomes. Perhaps every cloud does 
have a silver lining after all!  
Collective Problem-Solving 
The problem with silver linings is that they often come attached to rather ominous looking grey 
clouds. The clouds in the case of the foregoing discussion concern the generalizability of empirical 
results that are obtained in the rather restricted types of problem-solving domain used by Mason et 
al (2005) and Lazer and Friedman (2007). The fact is that both Mason et al (2005) and Lazer and 
Friedman (2007) use a specific type of task (involving collective search for optimal solutions) that is 
rather unlike that seen in many cases of real-world collective problem-solving. In order to improve 
the generalizability of the results, we need to look at the role of factors like network structure in 
                                                           
27 This dynamic profile of inter-agent trust evaluation effectively sets up the conditions for the emergence of 
constructive networks (networks in which the conduits of information flow and influence gradually emerge 
across time). It should be clear that such networks are on a functional par with those described in the context 




other  types  of  problem-solving  activity,  particularly  those  involving  some  degree  of  task 
specialization and inter-agent dependence. Further research will be needed to look at the various 
types  of  problem-solving  task  in  which  social  groups  participate  (perhaps  developing  a  formal 
taxonomy of task types) and develop models of these tasks for use in future computer simulation 
studies.   
Network Studies on Shared Interpretation 
Recall  Hutchins’  (1995)  work  on  the  role  played  by  inter-agent  communication  in  enabling  a 
community of agents to arrive at an accurate (and sometimes not so accurate) shared interpretation 
of some external state-of-affairs. Such work has potential implications for our understanding of how 
a network affects a group’s ability to deal with poor quality information, for example, information 
that is ambiguous, inaccurate, inconsistent or incomplete. In thinking about possible extensions to 
Hutchins’ work, it will no doubt be important to reflect on the relevance of Hutchins’ studies to our 
notions of both shared situation awareness (Nofi, 2000) and shared understanding (Smart et al., 
2009a; Smart et al., 2009b). It will also be important to assess whether factors like time-variant trust 
evaluations and dynamic network topologies deliver the same profile of performance benefits in the 
case of shared interpretations as they do in other cases of collective problem-solving. Finally, there 
are some potentially very interesting linkages between the work on shared interpretation and the 
work on coupled belief systems and cultural models. In particular, the notion of coupled belief 
systems seems to capture elements of the internal drive for consistent interpretations seen in the 
case  of  constraint  satisfaction  networks,  as  well  as  the  influence  exerted  by  inter-agent 
relationships. Furthermore, the notion of cultural models reminds us that within any significantly 
sized population we may encounter culturally-significant groupings that differ with regard to their 
beliefs,  attitudes  and  values.  Applying  the  notion  of  cultural  models  to  Hutchins’  simulations 
encourages us to think about groups of agents that have specific biases and predispositions with 
regard to their interpretation of environmental information. That is, we may see multiple groups of 
agents that are inclined to interpret common bodies of information in different ways based on their 
membership of specific cultural groups. By introducing the notion of cultural models into network 
simulations of shared interpretation, we thus potentially approximate the kind of socio-cognitive 
dynamics  we  see  in  situations  involving  the  cooperative  (and  sometimes  not  so  cooperative) 
interaction  of  culturally-disparate  communities.  This  work  is  thus  highly  relevant  to  research 
programmes, such as the International Technology Alliance
28 (Preece & Sieck, 2007), which attempt 
to further our understanding of the forces and factors that influence collective cognitive processing 
in multi-cultural military coalitions. 
Conclusion  
This has been a long paper but an important one in terms of our understanding of network-enabled 
cognition. From our initial analysis of belief propagation in heterogeneous agent communities we 
have now examined a variety of ways in which the cognitive profile of multi-agent systems can be 
both enabled (and sometimes disabled) by the dynamics of network-mediated information flow and 
influence. Moving on from the work of Glinton et al (2010) and Parachuri et al (2010) we saw how a 
specific  model  of  biological  evolution,  one  which  was  initially  developed  to  support  our 
understanding of complex adaptive systems, could be used to potentially advance our understanding 
                                                           




of cognitive state fluctuations in social networks. In particular, we suggested that Kauffman’s (1993, 
1995) NK(C) model could be used to support our understanding of cognitive flux in epistatically-
linked belief systems. The key idea here concerned how the genetic notion of epistasis could be 
applied to the problem of representing the inter-dependencies between specific beliefs at both the 
individual and collective levels. We also saw how the NK(C) model could be applied to belief systems 
at the cultural level, and we advanced the, admittedly speculative, proposal that the relative stability 
of  particular  ideologies  (cultural-level  belief  systems)  could  be  understood  in  terms  of  the 
emergence  of  Nash  equilibria.  Such  ideas  provide  the  basis  for  a  variety  of  future  computer 
simulation studies in which the focus of analysis is on the way in which networks contribute to 
cognitive dynamics at the individual, social and cultural levels. 
Aside from the role of networks in cognitive state fluctuations, we also examined work exploring the 
effects of network-level variables on collective problem-solving performances. Here we encountered 
the idea that time-variant changes in network architecture permit flexible forms of adaptive coupling 
between the elements of a larger information processing system. Dynamic networks, we argued, 
enable agents to regulate their exposure to social information flow and influence in a way that 
benefits long-term collective performance.   
The  notion  of  adaptive  coupling  is  of  potential  significance  not  just  for  our  understanding  of 
collective cognition; it also enables us to perhaps better understand the profile of much individual 
cognition.  Thus  just  as  the  notion  of  adaptive  coupling  in  social  networks  may  help  us  better 
understand the roots of collective cognitive success, so too our understanding of individual cognition 
may be enhanced by recognizing the way in which material resources are flexibly factored into 
episodes of individual cognitive processing. The key idea here is that human cognitive processing is 
not  necessarily  something  that  relies  solely  on  the  dynamics  of  neural  information  processing; 
instead,  cognition  may  sometimes  be  environmentally-extended,  entangling  all  manner  of 
representational  and  computational  resources  into  complex  time-variant  nexuses  of  cognitively-
relevant information processing. The result is what Wilson and Clark (2009) refer to as transient 
extended cognitive systems (TECS): 
“A TECS is a soft-assembled whole that meshes the problem-solving contributions of the 
human brain and central nervous system with those of the (rest of the) body and various 
elements of the local cognitive scaffolding” (pg. 65) 
Applying these ideas to the realm of large-scale information networks and network-enabled devices 
gives us the notion of what we have referred to, in other work, as the ‘network-extended mind’ 
(Smart et al., 2010), a notion that is just as applicable to collective forms of cognition as it is to more 
individual, agent-centred forms of cognitive processing. In fact, rather than see collective cognition 
as something that is wholly distinct from individual cognition, perhaps we can now begin to see 
commonalities between the two phenomena. The notion of adaptive coupling, in conjunction with a 
network-based approach to modelling, simulation and analysis, enables us to see both individual and 
collective forms of cognition as both resulting from the flexible integration of a variety of resources 
into dynamically-configured networks. In fact, perhaps it no longer makes sense to talk of individual 
and collective forms of cognition; for all cognitive processing is, in some sense, collective. Rather 
than see our biological selves as the sole point source for all our individual cognitive successes and 




adequate emphasis and recognition to the role played by networks that transcend the traditional 
borders of skin and skull. And from such a standpoint, perhaps we can begin to see both individual 
and  collective  forms  of  cognition  as  on  a  functional  par;  for  they  both  stem  from  the  largely 
ephemeral  webs  of  information  flow  and  influence  that  are  spun  around  the  elements  of  our 
biological, social and technological worlds.  
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